Strategies for designing, testing and demonstrating safety : what synthetic biology can learn from retrospective cases by Yeddanapudi, Neelima, 1976-
Strategies for Designing, Testing and Demonstrating Safety:
What Synthetic Biology Can Learn From Retrospective Cases
by
Neelima Yeddanapudi
B.S., Electrical Engineering and Computer Science (1999)
M.Eng., Electrical Engineering and Computer Science (2002)
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Submitted to the Engineering Systems Division
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of
ARCHNES
Master of Science in Technology and Policy
at the MASSACHUSETTS INSTlT'JTEOF TECHNOLOGY
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
JUN 2 3 2010
September 2009
LIBRARIES
@ 2009 Massachusetts Institute of Technology
All rights reserved
Signature of A uthor: ....... ... ......... .. ........... ................ .................
Technoogy and Policy Program
August 15, 2009
C e rtifie d by : ................... ............................... . ......................................................
Kenneth A. Oye
Professor of Political Science and Engineering Systems
Thesis Supervisor
A c c e p t e d b y : ... .. ... ... ... .. . -- --- ... .. ... ... ... ... ., ...r l n .. .. . . .. .. .. . a .. N..e.... ... . . . .Acceted y: DavaiJ  ewman
Professor of Aeronautics and Astronautics and Engineering systems
Director, Technology and Policy Program

Strategies for Designing, Testing and Demonstrating
Safety in Synthetic Biology
by
Neelima Yeddanapudi
Submitted to the Engineering Systems Division on August 8th 2009
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of
Master of Science in Technology and Policy
ABSTRACT
Synthetic biology is an emerging technology field within the realm of genetic
engineering, differing from traditional genetic engineering in that it focuses on the
modularization of genetic parts and the creation of de novo organisms. Significant
concerns over safety have been expressed. This research explores traditional
engineering and biotechnology practices for overarching principles of design, testing
and demonstration that address safety concerns. The information is used to assess the
current state of design, testing and demonstration in current synthetic biology projects
addressing safety. Component and system design literature provide an engineering
backbone of safety systems however, biological attributes such as mutation, growth,
and multiplication create safety gaps, where biological engineering practices are
needed. These principles are organized into categories of design and testing, and testing
and demonstration to gain greater insight on where gaps in the literature might lie.
Retrospective cases of traditional engineering and current cases of biotechnologies
provide external validation and further illustrate which practices address which design,
testing and demonstration needs. While most of the traditional engineering cases
addressed safety through design and testing, when they were faced with questions of
safety, they presented specific efforts to gain public confidence. The probiotics case was
different in that the safety concerns came from the scientific community since history is
being used as the convincing demonstration of safety. The three synthetic biology
research projects cross the divide between traditional engineering and biotechnologies,
but theses efforts are firmly in the area of design and testing. These efforts begin to
show the tradeoff between implementing safety and faster technical results. Strategies
for further research are explored.
Thesis Supervisor: Kenneth A. Oye
Title: Professor of Political Science and Engineering System
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Chapter 1: Introduction
Synthetic biology is an emerging technology field within the realm of genetic
engineering. It holds the promise of developing sustainable biofuels, better
pharmaceuticals, and advanced medical therapies. However, as with any biological
research, there are safety and environmental concerns. In particular, there is a fear that the
accidental or intentional release, administration, or consumption of genetically engineered
products or organisms could potentially endanger public health and the environment. The
1975 Asilomar conference provided a platform on which the safety of biological
engineering could be addressed. It resulted in the establishment of biological safety
laboratories with various levels of safety, as well as standards of practice that included
working with weaker organisms. Still there remains substantial uncertainty regarding what
types of threats are possible, whether concern for future occurrences could affect the safety
of current research practices, and whether established safety guidelines can handle
emerging practices in genetic manipulation. This uncertainty combined with public
distrust of scientists illustrates how the anticipation and mitigation of risks is becoming a
fundamental challenge in designing biotechnological products and practices. As a pre-
emptive approach in addressing these concerns, the National Science Advisory Board for
Biosafety (NSABB) and the National Institutes of Health Recombinant DNA Advisory
Committee (NIH RAC) Roundtable on Synthetic Biology expressed interest in efforts to
"engineer containment into synthetic systems/organisms" and asked synthetic biologists to
take on the this challenge. [NSABB 2007]
A report by the Woodrow Wilson Institute found in their "survey among 1,003
adults" that, when provided with a description of the potential risks and benefits of
synthetic biology, the proportion of those inclined to believe that "the risks would
outweigh the benefits" exceeded the proportion of those inclined to believe the reverse.
[Peter D. Hart Research Associates 2008] In synthetic biology, scientists address issues of
risk mitigation and safety by learning to predict and control viability, horizontal gene
transfer, and genetic stability in complex and uncontrollable environments. While
scientists perfect engineering these strategies into their biological designs, they are also
looking for ways to assure the broader, non-expert community that their safe designs are
reliable. It will take substantial testing and demonstration to overcome the asymmetry in
knowledge between what the scientists assert and what the public believes or will most
likely believe. Assurances of safety may have no credibility without proper engagement of
the stakeholders, engagement that not only seeks to inform but also to improve designs
and tests through feedback from those broader communities. This research investigates
what methods are used to implement safety and gain public confidence, both currently and
in the past, and asks how those methods are being or can be applied in synthetic biology to
help advance the field safely. This introduction serves to provide additional context to
these questions, the motivation for asking them, and the scope and approach taken in this
investigation.
1.1 Background
1.1.1 Biotechnology Concerns
As a starting point, it seems most logical to discuss safety concerns as they relate to
biotechnologies. Despite the contributions of genetic research such as DNA sequencing,
human understanding of the underlying mechanisms and "laws" governing biological
systems is incomplete. In fact, greater knowledge and the resulting increase in
biotechnological development have introduced new areas of uncertainty with respect to
safety.
One clear threat to human safety involves work with extremely dangerous and
infectious diseases such as Spanish influenza, polio, or smallpox. Driven to develop
improved methods of fighting disease scientists collect or resurrect viral or bacterial
contagions for purposes of study and experimentation. This leads to fears of accidental
exposure and release similar to the 1978 case of accidental laboratory exposure to smallpox
in Birmingham, England. [Fenner, Henderson et al. 1988]. Other sources of human
exposure with uncertain consequences include genetically modified foods and pesticides,
gene therapies, or simply working with or modifying biological organisms in a laboratory or
factory. In fact, it is the practice of creating or modifying that emphasizes the amount of
uncertainty present, as in the 2001 case of the mouse pox virus, that was modified to serve
as a contraceptive, but became a highly potent pathogen instead. [Jackson, Ramsay et al.
2001]
Uncertainty with respect to safety also refers to environmental threats. George
Church highlights a number of instances where animal and plant populations were
affected for the worse by human interference. [Church 2005] He and others discuss how
the introduction of new or non-indigenous species can disturb an ecosystem. While the
ecosystem will probably reach equilibrium eventually, it may become a new ecosystem,
unfriendly to the original specie inhabitants. Such environmental alterations could result
from bioremediation, genetically modified crops or pesticides, or the unanticipated release
of a genetically created or modified microbe.
Exposure can be intentional, such as with a genetically modified pesticide or a gene
therapy; or it can be unintentional, as with accidental disease exposure or microbe release.
In the case of synthetic biology, the purpose of a genetically modified or created microbe
will dictate whether it should survive in various environments and determine for how long.
Such careful design should explicitly account for the limits of current human knowledge
regarding the mechanisms at work in biological systems and how they behave over time.
As Ellenberg and Chen state, "we would all like such products to pose zero risk of
adverse effects. Unfortunately, this goal is not achievable for any pharmacologically active
product." [Ellenberg and Chen 1997] Since safe design can only minimize the number of
potential dangers inherent in a particular biotechnology, it is important to communicate:
how the safety is only reliable within a particular degree or threshold value, what that
threshold value is, and consequently what behavior complies with the limitations of the
provided safety. Managing actual safety is the first step in handling fear. However, if the
existing fear is not addressed, it has the potential to self-sustain and persist on its own.
Therefore mishandling or misunderstanding fear can lead to additional problems.
Past mistakes and accidents have damaged credibility of safety assurances in existing
biotechnologies, including assurances from the technology wielders and the institutions
and companies they work for. While harm may be unintentional, various other forces may
play an unwitting part in undermining the implementation of safe design and testing.
Similarly, the push for progress may all but eliminate motivation and efforts to engage in
credible demonstrations.
Medicine is an area where biotechnologies hold great potential to contribute both
positively and negatively. Unfortunately, the push for results stemming from a company's
pipeline depletion, medical urgency, or the need to achieve tenure or produce publications
may hurry safe design and testing to their detriment. In 1999 Jessie Gelsinger volunteered
as a healthy individual and was killed by the administration of an experimental gene
therapy. The viral vector used to carry the gene therapy caused his death. [Stolberg 1999]
Perhaps further tests for safety or interference with the patient system were warranted.
Another problem is that the push for immediate or positive results may have undermined
implementing safe design and testing. Needless to say, this damaged public trust in
researchers, clinical studies and gene therapies. Boston University's initial disregard of the
Boston community in building their Bio Safety Level (BSL) 4 laboratories, [Lawler 20051
did little to mitigate that pattern of distrust.
Public trust in companies or industries is no greater. In 1985 Advanced Genetic
Sciences Inc. neglected to notify the community or gain their acceptance before going
ahead with plans to conduct field tests of ice-minus bacterium. [Sun 1986] This failure to
communicate or involve the community enraged the public and provoked a controversy on
field tests. This type of behavior promotes the belief that dollar signs are of primary interest
to corporate biotechnology, and that interest will outweigh incentives to minimize risk and
protect their communities and their customers.
1.1.2 Effects of Concerns
While the products of biotechnology may have deleterious effects that one must
protect against, safe design is not enough. Just as important is testing those designs and
demonstrating the safety provided by those designs. The effects of fears can create just as
many research, economic, and societal hurdles as the dangers inherent in biotechnology.
Fears, whether founded or unfounded, can slow or prevent technological progress
and development. They can lead a government to take steps that hinder, suspend or
eliminate future research, as in 1976 when the city of Cambridge tried to prohibit
experiments with recombinant DNA. [J. Dyson 19811 Existing fears push for government
interference that may generate unnecessary obstacles in the way of progress. Not only does
this reduce scientists' ability to function, it harms their faith in public interaction and
government authority, thus becoming a social divider. This may cause a flight of
researchers to alternative countries without technological oversight, leading to
uncontrolled, unrestricted research. A less extreme move might involve abandoning
academia for the corporate sector, (an area with less regulation over research), however
litigation over accidental injury from biotechnologies may contribute to the decline of
companies engaged in important biotechnology research such as producing vaccines.
Controversy over genetically modified organisms (GMOs), more specifically food or
pesticides has lead to regulatory inconsistencies across international lines and subsequent
economic consequences. Fear of GM foods, or foods treated with GM pesticides can
influence public purchasing negatively, regardless of the lack of evidence supporting claims
of negative affects. Furthermore, depending on the protective philosophy of governments,
it has led to trade inconsistencies that make it difficult to import and export food and
medications across international lines. Europe takes a caution first approach to GMOs
increasing the labeling requirements or preventing the import or sale of many genetically
modified foods, which can create trade difficulties, especially for US food exporters. In the
US, GMOs are considered substantially equal unless proven differently.
Essentially differences in trade restrictions create barriers based on individual
countries priorities and intentions to protect their public. These differences in safety
standards create inefficiencies in the market where companies must cater to multiple sets
of regulations causing a slower global market with increased inertia and an inability to
adapt. Furthermore, in addition to hassles of litigation, there is the cost of litigation and
uncertainty in regulatory frameworks that make commercial interests less likely to invest in
biotechnologies. This could lead to additional safety issues where the distrust of medical
therapies from genetic engineering leads to increased lawsuits, increasing prices of the
therapies, discontinued research or production, and a subsequent shortage in crucial
medical solutions when they are most needed.
This highlights the importance of ensuring that research and products of genetic
engineering are designed and tested for safety, and that convincing, credible
demonstrations are utilized to apprise the public of that safety. Fears built on little evidence
can not only cause problems for corporate interests and others such as farmers using that
technology, they can also affect the arbitration of scientific proof on the part of jurors in
civil cases. Additionally, in the case of vaccines and other medical therapies, fears of
therapies that overshadow fears of the disease lead to increased cases of disease, which in
turn elevate health threats to society. [Offit 2007] Furthermore, fears causing regulatory
action may result in rescission of approval for necessary remedies, like vaccines to prevent
major diseases in cattle, swine, and sheep. [Warren 19861
1.1.3 Current Public Perceptions and Discourse
One step to understanding public perceptions and discourse is to consider what the
general public understands or cares about. For instance, current issues reveal that some of
the most common concerns include health, financial conditions and employment, cheaper
living necessities such as fuel, leaving less of a carbon footprint, and less reliance on hostile
nations. Biotechnologies can benefit these causes with potential contributions to health
technologies that: facilitate cheaper health care, more efficient and targeted medical
therapies, easier and less painful therapies, and corrective rather than treatment therapies.
They can help broaden the jobs market with associated sectors that support biotechnology
development, mass production or provide complimentary technologies; and they can
facilitate improvements in cheaper fuels and environmentally sound products.
On the other hand, biotechnologies also have the potential to produce health
hazards such as biohazard accidents, emergent side effects of medical therapies, allergies to
GMOs, and bacterial resistance to existing antibiotics. They can also contribute to a loss of
employment by replacement industries and create more expensive fuels; or they may
contribute additional environmental concerns with emergent properties of biofuels or their
byproducts and waste, or the escape of genetically modified entities.
A survey sponsored by the Woodrow Wilson Institute explored public knowledge
and perceptions of synthetic biology. [Peter D. Hart Research Associates 2008] While the
methods and information used to administer this survey could be questioned with respect
to expressed biases, some aspects of public perceptions and biases regarding synthetic
biology were relatively clear. First, the public seemed mostly unaware of synthetic biology
and the associated research. The survey reveals a preponderance of risk-averse feeling since
providing information about synthetic biology caused more people to believe that the risks
would outweigh the benefits. Many of those who had never heard of synthetic biology were
willing to guess and provide opinions based on those perceptions, which reveals a tendency
for people to make associations with concepts they are already familiar with. Again, leaning
towards risks reveals association with biotechnology consequences rather than benefits.
These points highlight the importance of communication and demonstration in informing
the public, alleviating unfounded fears, allowing the public to contribute founded concerns
and input, and fostering an understanding of what to reasonably expect in terms of
benefits and perceived dangers. An informed public allows for productive involvement and
provides for more voluntary interaction with biotechnologies.
If Institutions and Industry continue with their research, even if practiced safely,
while disregarding ongoing fears and failing to reassure stakeholders and the interested
public, obstacles will continue to hinder their progress. Interest groups who advocate less
or no progress in biotechnologies will have greater influence as their message associates
more clearly with caution and protection of the public. As they tend to be comprised of
members of the "general," non-expert public and claim to be representative of the public,
their message will gain greater support.
1.1.4 Current Regulatory Frameworks
Historically, regulatory frameworks that deal with safety seem to be responsive
efforts rather than pre-emptive efforts. Many regulations, created by the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA), were created in response to adulterated foods and medical remedies
promoted by snake oil salesmen. Clinical research protocols were developed in response to
poorly tested medications or testing that harmed subjects. The National Childhood
Vaccine Injury Act (NCVIA) passed in 1986 was developed in response to cases where
patients developed the actual disease in full form instead of developing immunity.
With the advent of recombinant DNA techniques, scientists and legislators chose
to be pro-active because the possibility of creating a new disease or other type of hazardous
critter had dangerous implications. The Asilomar conference in 1975 was an attempt by
scientists to meet and discuss the technical implications, possibilities and dangers that may
result from rDNA research. They chose to institute a voluntary moratorium on research
until they could determine how to proceed safely. The Asilomar conference directly
resulted in the NIH guidelines for biotechnology research, including stipulations for
biosafety laboratories specifying research criteria that associated the research with the
necessary biosafety levels. In addition, they recommended one type of inherent safety
design - working with weaker organisms. [Rogers 1975]
Unfortunately, NIH guidelines could only be required of recipients of federal
funding. This meant that groups conducting genetic research with federal funding were
directly responsible for following the guidelines, while scientists working for corporations
enjoyed more freedoms. In 1986 the Coordinated Framework for Regulation and
Biotechnology [Unknown 1986] utilizing existing legislation such as FIFRA, TSCA, FDCA,
OSHA and APHIS, was devised to manage the issues associated with biotechnologies since
both their developmental processes and uses spanned a variety of areas covered by existing
US regulatory bodies. For instance, biotechnologies that result in pesticides are subject to
safety requirements under FIFRA and TSCA, while food and medical therapies are subject
to the guidance of the FDCA. Groups such as the CDC can require corporate compliance
with NIH guidelines in order to receive pathogens for the purpose of testing or
development of medical therapies. Subsequently, corporations that require the cooperation
and assistance of these organizations become subject to their requirements, expanding the
coverage of the NIH guidelines. As of yet there have been no known biological
catastrophes in the US, which suggests that the NIH guidelines have been successful. Yet
safety is still a concern, as the political reaction to biotechnologies especially in the case of
Europe, has shown.
1.2 Defining Synthetic Biology
1.2.1 What is Synthetic Biology?
Three advances in biological studies can be considered a significant part of the
foundations of synthetic biology. First, recombinant DNA (rDNA) technology, developed
in the 1970s, utilizes various restriction enzymes and ligases to cleave DNA fragments from
one organism and insert them into a DNA vector that can replicate in another organism.
Essentially, it was a method developed to generate sequences of DNA derived from
multiple sources. [F. Lodish, Berk et al. 2007] Second, systems biology, a method of
studying biology that has had recent popularity, explores the complex interactions of
multiple integrated components in living systems from a higher level, systemic perspective.
Potential research practices involve removing components of a system and observing the
resulting behavior, which could be cell death, loss of specific function or weakening.
Finally, the development of newer, faster DNA sequencing techniques, the process by
which the order of DNA bases is determined in a segment of DNA, has increased the
amount of genetic information available to scientists. "By mid-2008, complete genomes
were available for 719 prokaryotes (microorganisms that lack nuclei) and 23 eukaryotes
("higher" organisms with nucleated cells, including humans). An additional 446
eukaryotic genome sequences are in varying stages of completion." [Mukunda, Oye et al.
2009] The combination of rDNA technologies and information contributed by systems
biology and DNA sequencing has created a fertile bed for the emergence of activities
labeled synthetic biology.
Where traditional genetic engineering has involved combining DNA sequences
cleaved from an existing genome, synthetic biology, utilizing knowledge of the sequences,
aims to construct specific DNA segments from scratch before combining them. These
segments are referred to as "parts." When those "parts" are assembled through biological
reactions to perform a specific function (defined by the engineer), the combination can be
referred to as a "device," and devices can be integrated to perform processes in a system.
Thomas Knight notes that, "the key notion in the design of our strategy is that the
transformations performed on component parts during the assembly reactions are
idempotent in a structural sense. That is, each reaction leaves the key structural elements of
the component the same. The output of any such transformation, therefore, is a
component which can be used as the input to any subsequent manipulation." [Mukunda,
Oye et al. 2009] In other words, these systems can ultimately perform functions like
circuits, taking a certain input and producing an output, and like circuits, they can be used
as parts of a larger system or circuit.
Research in synthetic biology is still in its early stages, therefore it can be considered
a combination of two practices. Some types of research can be considered belonging to
systems biology, such as the top down (reductionist) approaches that are used to gain
information by reducing systems to their smallest pieces, along the way, figuring out how
those pieces function. Other types of approaches, such as a bottom up approach, involve
building components de novo. Some studies have manufactured vesicles with metabolic
functions, a possible cell membrane of sorts [Noireaux and Libchaber 2004], while others
involve adding components and observing the resulting behavior.
As suggested, the research can take many forms. Some scientists test current
understanding of biological systems by designing and constructing their own synthetic
biological systems that can model component behavior in natural cells. They also explore
the possibilities of using existing organisms such as yeast or E. coli, and optimizing these
biological systems for specific purposes by removing "unnecessary" or redundant elements.
These could serve as mini labs for experimenting with pathways or bodies for creating
novel organisms that fulfill specific purposes. Constructed metabolic pathways, essentially
programmed systems, can be used to generate products such as drugs or biofuels, or to
perform functions such as filtering contaminated water or delivering medical therapies.
One of the most fundamental ways in which synthetic biology differs from traditional
genetic engineering is the intention to build parts and standardize them. Moving forward
in this thesis, this characteristic will be considered the most distinguishing aspect of
synthetic biology. Many synthetic biologists are working to develop foundational
technologies that make the construction of synthetic biological systems easier, in other
words, a set of biological legos. The purpose is to simplify the assembly of designed systems,
with an "emphasis on developing modularized biological parts, protocols for
interoperability and standards for parts performance, open parts registries, and routinized
methods of assembly for creating biological devices." [Mukunda, Oye et al. 2009]
1.2.2 Potential Benefits and Safety Concerns
Given the current range of activity in synthetic biology research, one can look
forward to many potential benefits. First and foremost the "application of principles of
modular design may cut design costs and development times, allow parts outsourcing with
resulting scale economies, and allow more rapid diffusion of the methods of biological
design." [Mukunda, Oye et al. 2009] This will provide tools for facilitating faster advances
in biotechnology as well as encouraging multiple approaches to managing various health
and environmental challenges. There is a potential for alternative biofuels: diesel, ethanol,
and non-ethanol, and reducing dependence on non-renewable resources. Further advances
could reduce dependence on specific feedstocks whose increased use could cause changes
in environmental conditions as well as displace indigenous species and societies.
Contributions to public health include the development of tumor-seeking bacteria,
artemisinin or new vaccines; or broadening knowledge of existing or past diseases through
actual experimental study.
However, with synthetic biology emerging as a new biotechnology, it seems prudent
to examine how safety concerns differ from those currently studied in traditional genetic
engineering. An e-conference conducted by Markus Schmidt found that "Synthetic biology
has been considered to be a sophisticated continuation of genetic engineering, implying
that biosafety issues would only different quantitatively and not qualitatively." [Schmidt,
Torgersen et al. 2008] Traditional genetic engineering involves highly skilled and educated
scientists who custom design sequences of DNA utilizing complicated and time-consuming
methods. However, with the intention to standardize parts and processes along with
decreasing time and expense, the assembly of biological systems will be possible for less and
less skilled technologists, perhaps creating a qualitatively new challenge.
The evolution of existing organisms required millions of years of development,
including trial and error with mutated sequences and adaptive alterations to a constantly
changing environment. Though existing biological systems can be considered ad hoc, there
may be specific biological reasons for various types of redundancy and "unnecessary"
genetic sequences that may result in protection for the organism or protection for those it
shares an environment with. Current efforts to optimize organisms may ignore or be
unaware of these complexities. Especially since knowledge of biological systems and how
and why they function is still expanding, indicating that the knowledge is yet incomplete.
One might argue that an educated scientist would take this into account when designing
their entities, however the same cannot be said of unskilled tinkerers with access to easily
understandable parts and assembly protocols. This has the potential of endangering an
individual working with the parts or the surrounding individuals or environment.
Furthermore, incomplete knowledge of an organism means an incomplete ability to predict
how that organism will interact with its environment. Interactions with an environment
may cause irreversible alterations to the environment or to the organism itself, perhaps
causing it to pose additional danger. There is an uncertainty and unpredictability
associated with living systems that makes it difficult to anticipate these types of
consequences.
Other concerns that may be shared with traditional genetic engineering include the
"Theseus paradox" which questions how many alterations can be made before an organism
is no longer associable with the original. In the case of safety, if a host organism is
considered harmless, how many alterations can be made before that becomes invalid and
re-evaluation is necessary. What if the organism is completely developed from the ground
up? Is it still the same? It seems that traditional rDNA work with microbes rendered the
microbes incapable of survival outside the laboratory, however since current work involves
creating microbes for a particular purpose, that might involve increasing its ability to
survive. In this case, environmental concerns with biotechnologies will take center stage,
along with questions of deliberate release and organism lifecycles. Critters designed to
perform functions in environments outside the laboratory may need survival time limits.
How these types of creations or alterations affect safety will be pertinent when questions of
testing for safety come later.
1.3 Scope
1.3.1 Relevant Literature
Given the current reservations felt towards the field of biotechnologies, the focus of
this research centers on how to support safe progress in synthetic biology through optimal
practices in safe design, testing and demonstration. Given the traditional engineering and
biotechnological influences over synthetic biology, it seems prudent to draw on literature
from both areas and the various disciplines within them, in order to explore the strengths
and weaknesses of approaches in those fields, and to inform the safe practices explored in
this thesis. Literature on design and testing has been drawn from these areas, while the
demonstration literature discusses the successful diffusion of technology and the practices
that influence successful adoption, including utilizing stakeholder involvement.
To provide an element of external validation as well as anecdotal evidence of
successfully applied principles in design, testing, and demonstration, retrospective
engineering and biotechnology mini cases have been collected. Examples of safety
engineering in bridges, buildings and devices as well as safe practices in probiotics and
vaccine development contribute both traditional engineering and biotechnological
perspectives on safe design.
The second piece of this thesis draws on synthetic biology literature and
information gained from interviews with various laboratories working on safe design in
synthetic biology. This thesis mainly considers safe chassis design being developed in three
local or "accessible" laboratories: MIT (Thomas Knight), Harvard (George Church), and
Lawrence Berkeley (Adam Arkin) laboratories.
1.3.2 Area of Inquiry
It is stated in the beginning of this introduction, this research seeks to explore
methods of implementing safe design, testing, and demonstration, both currently and in
the past, in order to better facilitate safe progress in synthetic biology research. It assumes
there is a benefit to continued research but recognizes the potential for losses, therefore the
focus here is to present a different way of thinking about the incorporation of safety in
design that will support beneficial advancement and avoid collateral loss.
This thesis will not engage in a risk-benefit analysis focused whether to continue
practices in synthetic biology. Nor will it debate probabilistic outcomes of damage or
benefits. Rather, given an assumption that synthetic biology will continue to develop, it will
ponder what strategies can best mitigate the risks and enhance the benefits.
While it acknowledges the existence of ethical arguments associated with the
continued practice of synthetic biology, neither will this thesis debate the ethical
implications of continuing this research.
Finally, this thesis will not examine which principles of safe design, testing, and
demonstration are better than others. Rather, it will explore safety issues and determine
what principles would be useful in providing that safety.
Given the implied relevance of engineering and biology in synthetic biology, this
thesis explores practices for safe design, testing, and demonstration in those areas and their
applicability to synthetic biology. Moving forward "engineering" shall describe those
practices associated with traditional engineering disciplines such as structural, mechanical
or electrical engineering. "Biotechnology" shall describe those practices utilized in biology
and chemistry laboratory research as well as biological engineering. These two areas contain
insightful literature and germane examples that have the potential to guide future practices
in synthetic biology. The strategies explored might hopefully provide guidance for scientists
and regulators.
1.4 Approach
As mentioned above, initial steps to this thesis involved studying the field of
synthetic biology, as well as exploring extensive literature in safe design, testing, and
demonstration across a variety of disciplines. The information gained from this literature
review has taken form as overall concepts and categorized principles. Based on the theory
presented around these practices, this thesis combines the practices of design and testing
(D&T) and testing and demonstration (T&D), in order to tease out methods specifically
geared towards establishing safety and those geared towards establishing credibility. While
stakeholder input will be touched on in both areas, significant emphasis on stakeholder
interaction will be explored in the T&D section. The principles and practices studied in
testing seem to extend across the design and demonstration processes and are represented
as such. Engineering and biotechnological practices and principles are explored and
categorized into these combined areas D&T and T&D. This provides a look at the
strengths and weaknesses of engineering principles in these categories with respect to
synthetic biology and how principles of biotechnological design are needed to compensate
for some of these weaknesses.
Anecdotal evidence is surveyed for principles of safe design, testing, and
demonstration that lead to successful development and adoption of particular designs.
These principles serve as external informers and validators, and are also categorized along
the lines of engineering or biotechnology and T&D or D&T. A design space or diagram
will be created to further illustrate these concepts.
Practices in synthetic biology, specifically in safe chassis design will be studied and
compared to this design space. The purpose of which is to determine where current
practices may fall short and how they can be improved.
1.5 Structure of Thesis
The introduction provides a context that explores the concerns and resulting effects
fostered by continued research in biotechnologies. It also presents a description of
synthetic biology that reviews the origins, practices and perceptions, as well as the hopes
and concerns specific to this field. This is the description that shall be referred to in as this
discussion progresses. Chapter 2 explores the concepts of design, testing and
demonstration through a framework that categorizes these concepts as design and testing
(D&T) and testing and demonstration (T&D). The chapter will review relevant literature
in traditional engineering (e.g. structural, mechanical, electrical) and biotechnological
practices for theories that might provide useful principles for implementation of these
concepts. Chapter 3 provides anecdotal evidence that further explores the concepts of
design and testing and testing and demonstration utilizing principles obtained from the
literature. This chapter will broaden the analysis of safe design, testing and demonstration
and explore theses concepts in the context of synthetic biology. The final chapter
concludes with observations and suggestions for future research. It will also mention
potential lessons for scientists and regulators that might facilitate safe progress in the field.
Chapter 2: Designing for Safety
2.1 Defining Safety
In discussing safety and ways of incorporating safe design into synthetic biology, it
is first important to provide a definition of safety that will function in the context of
synthetic biology. Contributions from Webster provide a basic starting point. The
Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary defines safety as:
the condition of being safe from undergoing or causing hurt, injury or loss;
where safe is defined as:
- secure from threat of danger, harm, or loss, and
- not threatening danger,
and fail-safe is defined as:
- incorporating some feature for automatically counteracting the effect of
an anticipated possible source of failure, and
having no chance of failure: infallibly problem-free
[Unknown 2009]
Two subtle points are significant here. First, attention should be drawn to the fact
that the definition does not specify the entity to which "condition" refers. It could be an
object, organism, or any type of system. Second, the implication of the word, "condition"
should be underscored. It can be interpreted as a state of being at a moment in time or
throughout a specified period of time; an interpretation that highlights the difference
between static and dynamic systems. Something can start off safe and become unsafe given
time, for instance the Minneapolis 1-35W bridge, opened in 1967, remained or was
considered safe for almost 40 years when it collapsed due to rusted and cracked supports.
This emphasizes the broader concept of dynamic conditions where safety can only be
applied to a particular instance in time and must be inferred in future scenarios. The
Tacoma Narrows Bridge was believed safe, yet its designers did not consider change in
external conditions such as wind. External changes as well as internal changes apply
dynamic pressures on an object and affect the state of safety that is assumed at any point in
time.
For the purposes of this discussion, safety shall be defined as a dynamic state when
a design (object, organism, system) is secure from experiencing or causing a non-desirable
event, such as harm or loss. Refining this definition for the purposes of engineering, it is
assumed that the design is composed of various components that work together to provide
safety, and that the quantity or level of safety is conditional upon the ranges of component
function under dynamic pressures.
2.2 Design, Testing and Demonstration
There exists a conventional perception of engineering processes that can be
described as design, then construction, then a combination of testing and demonstration,
where testing is most closely associated with validating and is many times lumped in with
or placed instead of demonstration (Figure 2.2-1). This paradigm can be considered to
have four phases where constructing the design (II) takes place with the assumption that
the design phase (1) has been completed. Testing and/or demonstration (III) is expected to
take place after the system has been designed and built and is ready for validation, where
presentation of validation results may be considered demonstration. The final phase of
continued performance (IV) takes place afterwards with the assumption that the system will
exist and function adequately on its own. Typically the overall process will contain overlap,
but these steps are generally considered as independent processes that usually occur
TimeLine
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Figure 2.2-1
Clearly each of theses steps is important for a system to function properly. "Functioning
properly" will be considered the successful provision of safety in this thesis.
Intuitively, a design should exist before a system is built because planning is
essential in optimizing safety. Yet, design doesn't end at the plan. Construction brings
realization to the plan, however design should be thought of as an ongoing process during
the construction phase in order to incorporate the ability and expectation of adaptation as
time reveals additional criteria or altered conditions (Figure 2.2-II)(II).
Similarly, the role of testing should not be confined to a post-design and post-
construction phase (Figure 2.2-II)(I-V). The term "testing" can refer to methods of
g
experimentation or methods of validation. Validation can be defined as the "confirmation
by examination and provision of objective evidence that the particular requirements for an
intended use are fulfilled." [Frey and Dym 2006] Experimentation, on the other hand, can
play a substantial role in design and construction as the practice of conceptually testing the
design as well as interim testing of the system and components provides ongoing
knowledge to the designer. Both are important in testing for safety and do not have to
occur only after a system has been designed and constructed. Experiments provide a
method for better understanding a design or parts of a design and they "help to reduce the
bias that can exist in less rigorous forms of observation." [Mcdermott 2002] In addition,
Myron Uman suggests predicting the results in an experiment in order to better
understand the results of the test as well as evaluate and improve understanding of the
system. This is different than a validation approach where specific results are expected
because they are the intended results. Simply relying on validation leads to planning ahead
based on expected results, a practice that can create difficulties when a system needs actual
results to move forward and later provide the expected results. [Unknown 2004]
Experimentation can also play a role post-design and construction because it helps
determine system limitations when functioning under various circumstances, and
monitoring throughout the expected functional lifecycle (V) helps maintain the system and
manage any deterioration in safety aspects of the design. Validation on the other hand
tends to refer solely to whether a system provides the expected results, however this too can
be a process throughout as a system is made up of components whose validation may be
essential to the design and construction process. This chapter continues to explore some of
the current engineering literature relating to both experimentation and validation.
Demonstration can be a step that is easily skipped but can play a significant role in
the success of a design (Figure 2.2-II)(IV). It is especially useful when the success of the
design relies on the safety of a design. Having safety mechanisms that are validated does
little good when there is no way of providing stakeholders with an assurance of that
validation. Submitting measurements or results that speak to a scientist is not necessarily
considered demonstration when the audience is not composed of scientists. Furthermore,
it seems unwise to perform a validation test as a demonstration without almost complete
assurance that the expected results will occur. A true demonstration, conducted in public
in order to build credibility, is undeniably helpful, especially when it comes to safety.
Proper attention to demonstration strategies will help the overall acceptance of safe design.
Demonstration can also be used as a technique that facilitates interaction with
stakeholders. Stakeholder input has the potential to inform design and testing as well as
demonstration. Concerns of external non-expert stakeholders may differ from what a
scientist believes should be of concern. Interaction and involvement with stakeholders
bridges this gap and shares ownership, which facilitates positive acceptance and adoption.
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Figure 2.2-11
This diagram illustrates the relationships between these different processes. Phase I
covers initial design and conceptual testing. Phase II shows the overlap of design,
construction, and testing. Phase III is the validation and learning limitations phase. Phase
IV covers demonstration and additional testing and monitoring, and phase V illustrates
ongoing testing.
Clearly, all four of these steps, design, construction, testing and demonstration can
play a vital role in the success of a design for safety. Therefore it seems optimal to think
about all phases together instead of individually. In addition to considering function as the
purpose of the design, the designer might also think about ease in constructing according
to specifications, the ability to test to understand and validate the design, and the value of
demonstrating the safety of the design. In this case, the designer is designing for the overall
success of the design. Taking this a step further, thinking about these processes as
integrated rather than concurrent allows for a paradigm where each process enhances the
others functioning in a coherent synergistic system. As discussed above, testing facilitates
better design and demonstration, and demonstration can support successful adoption and
provide stakeholder input. This type of holistic paradigm, more commonly referred to as
systems thinking, supports using an integrated engineering design system (the combination
of design, construction, testing and demonstration) in order to successfully implement
safety in a design.
Due to the overlap in the design, construction and testing phases, this thesis will
explore both the integrated process of "Design & Testing" (D&T) where design includes
construction, and the integrated process of "Testing & Validation" (T&D) (Figure 2.2-11).
Daniel Frey and Myron Uman strongly stress the advantages of testing throughout
design. Uman advises that efforts at design incorporate testing into the design by checking
functionality while progressing. [Stever and Fletcher 19881 This interim testing is common
in systems design where parts need to function properly in order to advance construction.
It is also a concept familiar to biologists and chemists. Frey discusses an iterative process
that involves design followed by testing with the intention to redesign. Here results of tests
are not meant to validate, but to point out what is missing or what changes must be made
to achieve the desired goal. [Magee and Frey 2006] Combining these two approaches with
alternative design options [Stever and Fletcher 1988] creates a design system that can both
manage and exploit interim "failures." Given the recursive operation of design,
construction and testing (Figure 2.2-III)(A), it makes sense to explore strategies for safe
design in synthetic biology through the lens of "Design & Testing."
Similarly, since testing in the form of validation should support demonstration, it
also makes sense to think of "Testing & Demonstration" as its own lens. Furthermore
stakeholder input, obtained through the demonstration process, can be used to inform
testing strategies so that the safety criteria valued by stakeholders is recognized and
confirmed, illustrating another recursive relationship between testing and demonstration
(Figure 2.2-III)(B). As mentioned before, testing in this phase can be in the form of
validation or monitoring.
Figure 2.2-111
Despite considering this paradigm as two integrated processes, it is important to
realize that together they cover the entire lifecycle of a system from the beginning to the
end of function. Besides illustrating the recursive relationships already discussed, the
addition of a redesign loop further characterizes the feedback nature of the integrated
engineering design system (Figure 2.2-1II)(C). For example, surveillance, which can be
considered a form of ongoing field-testing or a natural experiment, facilitates testing and
demonstration which then facilitates new designing and testing.
2.3 Safety in Design and Testing
In understanding the strategies that go into design and testing for safety, as well as
the challenges and limitations, this section will explore the conventional wisdom and
contributions of various experts in the field as they touch on different aspects and
perspectives of, and approaches to safe design. In determining what is considered safe
design, the definition of safety written above is utilized. Acknowledging that an object,
organism, or system is most likely in a dynamic state, and that safety as a functional
attribute can only be claimed for a certain range of function, it is logical to characterize safe
design as a design that remains "safe" throughout its entire lifecycle. In this case, lifecycle is
defined to be the quantity of time when a design can be reasonably predicted to stay
functional. This is typically determined by the design's limitations in function or the
limitations of the components in the design.
2.3.1 Traditional Engineering
Lifecycle Engineering
In his book, To Engineer is Human, Henry Petroski discusses lifecycles and two
related design philosophies:
fail-safe
- those that incorporate structural obstacles to the spontaneous growth of
cracks that might escape detection, and
safe-life
* allows for the inevitability of failure well beyond the service life of the
structure
- function throughout the life of the structure
[Petroski 1992]
Both of these philosophies acknowledge the existence of dynamic pressures. If
"cracks" is replaced by small failures or small damages, his definition of fail-safe can be
extended to other engineering disciplines. Implementation of fail-safe design could involve
incorporating multiple mechanisms such as redundancies (e.g. multiple shells; inner plugs
& outer walls to prevent escape) or safety layers (e.g. airbags & anti-lock breaks). Another
method might be increasing robustness by substituting or utilizing error-tolerant or error-
resistant materials (e.g. fire-proof paints instead of flammable paints).
Safe-life allows for dynamic pressures to render an object unsafe and confines the
definition of safe design to a period of time where function can reasonably be expected.
Othmar Kippeli and Lillian Auberson support this approach asserting that safety "cannot
be expressed in absolute terms; it is a relative concept more adequately defined in terms of
tolerability and acceptability limits." [Kappeli and Auberson 19971 Utilizing multiple
mechanisms or alternative materials that increase robustness can also be of benefit in
implementing this design philosophy. Other methods involve: utilizing trial and error and
experimentation to determine limiting factors or components, and conducting hazard
assessments.
Systems Engineering
Designing for safety can be an extremely complex and thoughtful process. Whether
the design is for an object, organism, or system, the relevance of external and inherent
factors including temporal dynamics calls for a systemic approach to safety where "safe-life"
refers to the functional lifecycle of the entire system, and "fail-safe" refers to the
implementation of components in the system. For instance, the following sequence
highlights secondary and tertiary emerging threats that might not have been considered
initially when designing a water main.
l "'" j L"L"" ' ~~~~ [Petroski 1992]
Figure 2.3-1
Since it is the combination of multiple factors that lead to the overall loss, a
systemic approach to designing the water main and how it interacts with the existing
system might have yielded different design criteria in order to prevent loss. In other words,
fail-safes might have been implemented to prevent flooding, or fire, or the interference of
electrical service. Clearly, the functional attributes of objects and systems are intertwined;
therefore a comprehensive design approach calls for treatment of the design as an
individual component and as part of whole system. This approach to engineering is
especially valid given that safe design of a chassis in synthetic biology can be considered:
the safe design of a device, the safe design of a system that functions as a device, and the
safe design of a device component of a larger system. In other words, the chassis as a body
in which to build other parts functions as a device. Multiple pathways essential to the
function of a chassis indicate it is also a system. Finally, the chassis functions as a device in
a system when included in a therapy delivery system or part of a biofuels creation system.
Research by Nancy Leveson on safety systems, identifies safety as an attribute of a
system with multiple components. Components in a safety system must be verified reliable
in order to confirm overall safety, and understanding the functional ranges of those
components allows the designer to approximate the combined range of function in a
system designed for safety. She asserts that, "safety is assured by first identifying hazards
and then performing a fault hazard analysis where components are assigned a reliability
target such that the system as a whole can reach failure rate requirements." [Leveson 2003]
This can also be considered a method of determining the safe-life of a system.
It is important at this point to distinguish reliability from safety. Reliability refers to
whether something works as it is intended. A sharp knife slices and is fairly reliable at
achieving that goal. That a sharp knife, working as intended, can slice off a finger while
cutting indicates that perhaps a sharp knife is not necessarily safe. Similarly, the failure of a
system does not instantly mean it is unsafe. For instance, circuit breakers are meant to
cause circuit failures in order to maintain overall safety. Both failure and reliability can be
directly related to safety when the components and mechanisms that require reliability are
specifically intended for the purpose of ensuring safety. Leveson's claim that safety is
assured by assigning components of a system a required reliability factor in order to ensure
compliance with an overall system failure rate is predicated upon the assumption that the
system itself is a safety system. Considering safe design from a socio-technical perspective
allows the engineer to understand all the known components and their limitations. It is
then possible, as Petroski advises, to understand where the weakest links are and design for
them to withstand the greatest expected load or pressure.
While understanding safety systems is important in safe design, it is also important
to recognize external factors that play an influential role. In order to settle on a particular
safe design, basic assumptions regarding the operating environment should be
acknowledged, including: scale, complexity, time, deterioration rates, environmental
changes, component failures and component interactions. By understanding when and
where in a designed system these play a role, appropriate assumptions regarding the
intended operating situation can be made along with efforts that contribute to a safer
system. A more effective approach might be to expand the socio-technical system,
encompassing these external elements as internal ones in an effort to better understand
their roles. In other words, the safety system described above cannot be truly
comprehensive unless it incorporates the environment as an additional set of dynamic
components. In the context of a biological chassis as a device in a system, considering the
influence of these external elements allows a designer to further manage safe function with
respect to expected and unexpected situations or use.
Utilizing strategies associated with risk reduction, a general model for safe design
seems to be anticipating failure modes using event trees, or other types of extrapolation,
usually based on accident analysis techniques. Scenario methods for assessing long-term
impacts in advance also benefit from this type of analysis. In general, models and
simulations are very useful for this type of conceptual or theoretical testing, not only used
to test for the success or failure of a design, but to facilitate choosing between alternative
designs. Faisal I Kahn presents three strategies that echo Petroski's philosophies:
- inherent design - reducing or eliminating hazards by using materials and
process conditions which are less hazardous
* passive design - reducing or eliminating hazards by process and
equipment design features which reduce either incident frequency or
consequences without the active functioning of devices
* active design - using engineered features such as controls, safety
interlocks, and emergency, emergency shutdown systems to detect
potentially hazardous process deviations and to take corrective action
[Khan and Amyotte 2003]
In testing whether safe design can reduce risks and manage uncertainty, be it from
the perspective of a component or an entire system, it is impossible to ignore the need for
some type of measure or indicators that can help characterize the quantity of risk or
uncertainty reduced or the safety provided. Surrogates, attributes of the safety system that
may be correlated to the successful function of a safe design, can be used as indicators.
Additionally, while indicators of successful safe design might be difficult to identify, there
are indicators associated with the components in the system that are more readily
measurable. Measuring successful component function and aggregating that information
serves to determine the overall success of the safe design, however that relies on accuracy in
measuring successful component function. The ability to use indicators such as surrogates
as measures greatly enhances the ability to test the system. This is a strategy that proves
advantageous in checking functionality of components in systems, especially biological
systems. An engineered living system may have multiple outputs whose functioning
pathways are inter-connected. Affecting one pathway may affect another providing
surrogate indicators.
Utilizing hazard assessment techniques and indicators as measured elements, some
approaches to thinking about testing that can facilitate the design process include:
- testing to decide between design alternatives
o testing for conceptual success/failure of a design utilizing failure/hazard
analysis
- testing to inform design
e testing to validate components of a system - testing for reliability
e testing response of design to temporal effects or changes
Methods used for testing safe design can differ depending on the reason for testing.
This affects how the inputs and outputs in a test for safety are handled. One way to further
explore this concept is to ask the following two questions:
1. What is the approach used for testing?
2. Based on that purpose, what types of methods should be used?
For instance, testing for reliability of a design or of components of a design, as
Nancy Leveson recommends, can be considered an approach for establishing safety
assuming individual functioning components contributes to the overall safety of the
design. As noted before, something can be perfectly reliable and unsafe at the same time.
Therefore when using this approach to testing, the effectiveness depends on understanding
how each component contributes to the safety provided by the overall design. One
method, validating the function of individual components can involve testing: parts before
and after installation, testing parts in parallel subsystems, testing parts in serial subsystems,
and testing serial connections of redundant units. Another method involves disturbing the
function of individual components and observing how the overall design performs at
different component failure rates.
As stated earlier in this chapter, another approach is testing to inform design which
is suggested by both Myron Uman and Daniel Frey. This approach may involve
understanding the behavior of individual components, but it also may involve exploring
the behavior and/or characteristics of the materials used, the environment present, or
other conditions associated with the design. Drug development utilizes such testing to
determine useful chemical combinations or determine safety issues. Animal models or in
vitro samples are used because risk of adverse effects is unacceptable in a human subject
when safety information about the drug is unknown. Systems biology utilizes an approach
of testing to inform when removing elements from a system in order to identify the
usefulness of that element or what system's response behavior might be. Testing to inform
is specifically intended to observe elements or conditions of a design for the purpose of
understanding and improvement. This also includes utilizing a practice of intermediary
testing in order to iterate towards a particularly optimal design. [Magee and Frey 2006];
[Stever and Fletcher 19881
2.3.2 Biotechnologies
Safety in biotechnology research is most commonly associated with protecting
people, animals or the environment. George Church implies that the three best ways of
handling safety in biotechnologies is physical containment, biological isolation, and
training. [Church 2005] Physical containment can be implemented in laboratory settings
utilizing bio-safety levels to determine the type of safety protocols that are necessary to
conduct research. Training scientists to understand these biosafety levels and the
responsibilities associated with genetic research can only serve to enhance the safety
provided by physical containment. Biological isolation on the other hand refers to inherent
biological attributes that allow for the isolation of any type of genetically modified or
engineered organism in order to prevent unintended interaction with an environment
outside of physical containment. Physical containment and training can be considered
external components to manage external factors. This thesis will be confined to safe design
as it relates directly to the design of the organism and its internal mechanisms, making the
organisms safe to both work with and to create.
The following design methods manage challenges such as survivability, preventing
interaction, and preventing mutation away from the design's intended purpose. Two main
attributes, fairly unique to biological organisms, that create or contribute to significant
safety challenges include the ability to mutate, grow and multiply. Effective biological
principles for safe design would ideally manage these attributes. Literature on biological
systems, interviews with scientists and past research papers have provided a list of methods
that might be used in biological design.
First, the choice of the organism is rather important. If the organism is meant to
survive solely in the laboratory a weak (wimpy) organism is chosen. These types of
organisms are fully dependent upon the laboratory environment. If they get out into the
natural environment, survival is highly improbable because the types of nutrients,
combination of nutrients, or conditions of survivability are not immediately available. If
the culture becomes contaminated, the organism will most likely die. Establishing growth
in a rich synthetic and defined medium, or perpetuating slow growth and reproduction are
ways of ensuring that an organism will be nutritionally demanding or die before
replicating. To further enhance these attributes, it helps if the organism has low
biosynthetic abilities, lacks DNA repair proteins, is non-motile, and has little chance of
gaining these attributes through mutation. [Knight 2008]
If the organism is meant to survive in hostile environments, such as one meant to
deliver medical therapeutics from within the body, the organism must be fairly robust. In
this case, the organism should be stable and virus-resistant, meaning they are less likely to
mutate and less susceptible to viruses that work to insert their foreign DNA. These types of
organisms are less vulnerable to contaminants in an exposed culture, and less likely to
change function through adoption of foreign DNA. Specializing this organism for its
intended environment may make it less likely to survive escape. [Church 2008]
Another method of safe design is biological isolation. This can be done a number
of ways. Cells can be made to be virus-resistant, similar to above. They can be genetically
isolated, meaning they do not use the same codes as other organisms, causing them to
resist horizontal gene transfer. In the case that transfer cannot be prevented, codes can also
be changes so that they have no affect in other living systems. Incompatibility can also be
manufactured by utilizing synthetic nucleotides, designing left-handed DNA, or
incorporating 4-base amino acids. Genetic stability can be designed for by removing
transposons from cells, resulting in reduced mutation rates. Multiviral resistance can be
implemented by changing a single codon that consequently requires a virus to have at least
20 similar, simultaneous changes to its genome. [Church 2008]
Preventing the reproduction or multiplying of biological organisms can be
implemented a number of ways. One way is to "castrate" sexual organisms such as yeast by
removing any plasmids, which are the main tool of sharing DNA. In addition it keeps the
organism from mating or sporulating. Another method would be to reduce the nutrients in
the environment that support reproduction or multiplying, or reduce the ability of the
organism to take advantage of the needed nutrients. [Arkin 2009]
One of the attributes of a weak organism is its need for very specific nutrients.
Specific nutrient requirements doom these organisms to dying in non-specialized
environments. This can be implemented by deleting genes that code for a particularly
necessary codon that is extremely rare in the natural world, making the organism
dependent on the provision of the resulting nutrient from the laboratory environment.
Another method involves creating an addiction to an unnatural amino acid. Still another
involves creating organisms with a large number of nutrient requirements that are
individually available in the natural environment but rarely available together. In fact, this
could be a method of specializing a robust organism to survive solely in its intended
environment. It could also be utilized as a method of controlling growth or lifespan by
providing a limited amount of necessary nutrient. [Knight 2008]
Kill switches or off-switches are also useful in managing the safe use of living
systems. One way this can be done is by programming cell death through self-destruction
after a certain period of time or prescribed number of cell cycles, possibly by diluting a vital
necessity through multiple generations. Inserting a killing gene that is only expressed by a
harmless promoter (existing in nature, controlled, synthetic) will have the same suicidal
affect. A killing gene also works by expressing all the time except in the presence of some
type of anti-suicide protein that is provided in the laboratory culture. [Knight 20081
If an organism escapes into the natural environment, those methods that are
dependent on an external action will necessitate a method for locating or identifying the
escapee. Utilizing identifiers, such as programming the production of a particular protein
that can be detected in alternative environments, is a good way of implementing some type
of locating mechanism.
Probably the most useful method of design, one that is expressed as well in the
engineering literature is the practice of layering multiple safety mechanisms, for instance, a
kill-switch paired with an identifier or layering multiple subsistence requirements. [Church
2008; Knight 2008]
2.3.3 Synthesis of Traditional Engineering and Biotechnology Strategies
While the foundations of synthetic biology stem from biologic origins, many of the
practices such as building parts and standardizing components and protocols find their
root in traditional engineering, explaining the motivation for drawing from engineering
practices. However, since it is a biological system, engineering practices in design and
testing may not be completely applicable or offer clear solutions for safety challenges that
are mainly biological. The previous sections provide a framework built around concepts of
engineering for safety. The previous paragraphs explore biological methods for safety
mechanisms. Placing that framework in the context of synthetic biology, the rest of this
section looks at where the gaps are and explores biological practices that may add
alternative solutions. The section also reviews the challenges, posed by genetic engineering
and synthetic biology, which were discussed in the introduction and what biological
practices have been suggested to help.
The concept of component or system lifecycles, presented in the Petroski literature,
highlights the ideas of fail-safe and safe-life. The idea of fail-safe runs into problems with
biological entities because safety alterations to the biology of any organism that contains
DNA for the purposes of safety may not be permanent, in that DNA programmed fail-safe
mechanisms have the potential to fail due to mutations or function differently or less
effectively through subsequent generations. One way of handling this is to exercise some
type of control over factors that can cause mutations, or layer multiple mechanisms so that
there are alternative safety mechanisms in place. Layering reduces the probability of the
system failing if there are alternative methods for safe function.
Mutation also challenges the idea of safe-life, especially when it comes to figuring
out what determines the length of the design's functional lifecycle. Given the different
functional needs, lifecycle could pertain to the survival period of an individual organism,
or the average survival period of a group of organisms, or the combined survival of an
organism and subsequent generations until propagation stops and the organisms die. Each
interpretation has different implications and safety challenges. These complexities caused
by the timing of a mutation and the type of mutation reduces the ability to predict how a
system will respond given passage of time. Assessing the safe-life of living systems becomes
complicated and much less reliable than assessing the safe-life of a non-living system.
Drawing from Nancy Leveson's work, another highly applicable engineering
concept discussed above is the practice of safety systems engineering. Part of systems
engineering is trying to identify and understand those components that have the greatest
influence over the intended function of the system, and devising methods of controlling or
altering those components in order to support reliable system function. However, this
might be more feasible with a bridge or engine than a biotechnological system. The caveat
is that this method of engineering assumes that all relevant or influential components in a
system are known and all hazards can be identified and analyzed. The nature of a systems
design is dependent on the components, which leaves little room for unanticipated
complexities that may not have predictable attributes. The ability to mutate, grow and
replicate interferes with applying component and systems methods to living entities.
As stated before, knowledge of living systems is incomplete indicating that some
highly significant factors may be overlooked. There is a difficulty in predicting the ability to
mutate or how a living system will interact with its environment, intended or not intended.
Components that work when tested may not work at a later time. While this is true of
inanimate systems, deterioration due to environmental factors is a little easier to anticipate
and can possibly be measured unlike mutation. Furthermore, a living system also has the
potential to cause genetic changes in its environment, which may subsequently alter the
system's function. Biological efforts to increase an organism's stability might involve
reducing its ability to mutate by removing elements that support mutagenic processes, such
as its potential to genetically affect its environment by transferring DNA or its potential to
be genetically affected by its environment by incorporating foreign DNA.
A large amount of genetic engineering concerns involve exposure and damage to an
unintended environment. As mentioned above, organisms have the potential to interact
with their environments and there are ways to prevent or reduce the potential for those
types of interactions. Another danger is an organism's potential to multiply or survive in an
unintended environment. One method proposed for managing this is utilizing or creating
an organism whose nutrient requirements are rare, or require a rare combination of items.
Another method is to create a kill-switch that can be triggered by a substance that is
environmentally harmless or by quorum sensitivity where the large quantity of one of the
organism's byproducts is a trigger.
2.4 Safety in Testing and Demonstration
When exploring strategies in testing and demonstration, the types of testing
explored here are post design and construction. This type of testing includes testing for
validation, testing for credibility, testing across variable applications, environments or
target users, testing across variations in executed design, testing for future temporal affects
or changes, and again, testing to inform. Of these various approaches to testing, testing for
validation tends to line up with demonstration best. The text "diffusion of innovation"
states that there is a type of demonstration, usually conducted in private to make sure a
design works [M. Rogers 1995]. In the context of safety, this type of demonstration is
clearly synonymous with validation; something that one might want to know before
"demonstrating" in public. The second type of demonstration is conducted in private in
order to communicate or promote an idea or design as well as establish credibility.
Presumably, an effective demonstration of safety should be predicated on the successful
validation of the safety via testing. When searching for guidance on demonstrating safety,
the literature used included general ideas and notes on successful demonstrations,
demonstrating to promote technology, and demonstrating safety.
Testing for validation can include testing to a pre-determined set of specifications
or a pre-determined confidence level. This type of testing is conducted to verify that a
design performs under expected conditions. Tests for validation can be conducted from
component to component, or they can be conducted on the entire system utilizing the
intended environment such as a controlled field test. Scientific validation might use in vivo
tests with animal models or the actual intended subjects, incorporating methods of
randomization and matched controls or utilizing a broad sampling.
Testing for credibility involves testing done to establish the credibility with
stakeholders of the testing process. This can be done by utilizing user-defined testing,
testing to stakeholder expectations instead of standard specifications, or validating the
testing strategy such as examining whether: the strategy addresses the questions being
asked; the limits of the experimental system are known; testing interaction effects can be
identified and minimized; the testing population represents the intended users; the model
is validated; the test failure modes are known; the test itself is altered before or after
implementation of the technology; or whether anything else might interfere with readings,
measurements, recording, sensitivity, or detection. Some of the challenges that designers
and testers must consider involve how to interpret results, and how to account for aspects
of the testing design that may have biased the results. For instance, interpreting the
meaning of results may be determining what is safe enough? Is a particular drug considered
safe if 70% of the subjects survive? If 99% of the subjects survive, how significant are the
outlying events? Statistically the 1% of deaths may be considered too low to matter, or the
1% could refer to 100 patients in a sample of 10000, and analyzing those 100 may reveal
an unexpected interaction or event that renders the drug dangerous. How much of this
interpretation or whether a secondary analysis of the outlying 100 subjects will be
influenced by the needs of the designer or tester? Frey also names expectancy effects and
experimenter bias as some of the factors that may alter the credibility of the results
reported and therefore the testing process.
Testing across variable environments, applications, designs or target users seems
fairly self-explanatory. Essentially, this means testing the technology across situations since
they most probably are not standardized or might not otherwise be predicted. Sheldon
Krimsky advocates microcosm testing [Krimsky, Wrubel et al. 2007] which can represent an
environmental example of in vitro testing. The advantage of using microcosm testing is the
ability to mimic potential environments and observe an organism's affect on or behavior in
the environment. Some of the user attributes tested for include experience with technology
or prior knowledge of the technology or the working conditions.
Testing for variation across executed designs looks at differences in quality, scale or
quantity. When discussing testing, one of the requirements of credibility in evaluation is
the reproducibility or repeatability of tests. While non-living parts may deteriorate over
time, the results of test on a part will typically stay consistent over a shorter and more
immediate window. Therefore there is a type of reliability in the results that may not be
true for living components. Another problem with testing is that biologics can be used up
in the process. Some approaches to addressing such a problem can be found in chemistry
where samples of batches are taken and tested. In this case, the question is how broad a
sampling must be tested to provide reliable results? In a chemical batch that has not been
contaminated, it can usually be assumed that each molecule of that batch is identical. That
is not the same for a batch of organisms, as variations exist in multiple organisms of the
same type.
Petroski suggests that design, as it is a proposal of a working system, be considered a
hypothesis. [Petroski] In this case, the hypothesis that requires validation states that the
design will actually be safe. While this type of hypothesis can accumulate numerous
instances of verification, it cannot be assumed fact until all conditions under which the
hypothesis functions if fulfilled. In other words, a design is only successful until the
moment it fails. A scientific hypothesis is tested by comparing its conclusions with the
reality of the world as it is. Just one instance of disagreement between the hypothesis and
reality is sufficient to make the hypothesis incontrovertibly false. For instance, asserting
that a structure will last forever can never be proven true, but will always maintain the
possibility to be proven false. Asserting that a structure will last 100 hundred years will only
be proven true when the 100 years has elapsed. This emphasizes the importance of
specifying conditions for expected success, especially in designing for safety. As Myron
Uman suggests, experimentation for knowledge can be used to determine limitations,
conditions and ranges of function. [Stever and Fletcher 1988] This includes tests for how
and what types of changes take place over time. In other words, these can all be testing to
inform which include testing to establish margins of safety over maximum expected
operating conditions and the service life which can then be extrapolated to safe-life. Some
of this testing can be done through surveillance methods after a design has been adopted.
Continuous monitoring can be considered a form of ongoing field-testing or natural
experiment. Unfortunately, once a technology is in use, it is outside the controlled
conditions and there may be a need for other types of learning to corroborate the data.
However, some of the benefits associated with surveillance testing include the acquisition
of data that may support need for more studies or design changes, the ability to rapidly
document effects or side effects of the technology, and the ability to generate early warning
signs.
Moving on to demonstration, it seems helpful to search history for successful
demonstrations outside of demonstrating safety. Edison's "demonstration of the
incandescent electric light" and Alexander Graham Bell's demonstration of "his new
telephone invention at the New Haven Opera House" are particularly good examples.
Edison's demonstration was advertised in order to gather a crowd. Bell's demonstration
was in front of faculty and students, utilizing a member of the audience to attest to the
success of his invention. [K. Long 2006] These individuals were adept at handling a crowd,
picking their audience, and utilizing a volunteer to establish credibility because they
understood that a cynical audience would better relate to or trust the experience of one of
their own. Magicians are another group of individuals who know how to utilize an
audience to establish credibility. In medicine, there are many examples of the power of
anecdotal evidence. "Patients who have had a vaccine-preventable disease, like polio, and
physicians who worked in polio wards in the 1950s are more likely to be stronger advocates
of polio vaccination than patients or physicians who never saw wild polio disease. Personal
stories can be a powerful influence and motivator, especially if they are emotionally
compelling." [Chen and Hibbs 1998]
Demonstrations that promote technology can be executed a number of ways. An
auto show, for instance allows an audience to interact with cars promoting an excitement
of the new and shiny. Another method of demonstration is a competition such as a race or
an X-prize that gains notoriety for the winning design, utilizing judges who establish
credibility and witnesses who experience the success of the design. Another way to promote
successful diffusion of innovation is to use an opinion leader. The text "diffusion of
innovation" identifies opinion leaders as individuals who can act as an advocate for a
particular technology. This highlights the importance of picking your first audience
carefully because if the individual has the power to promote an innovation in technology,
they may have the same influential power to defame it. Another important aspect in
utilizing opinion leaders is to avoid the appearance of bias, which can negate any bit of
potential influence an opinion leader might have had. [M. Rogers 1995]
Indications of a successful demonstration of safety could be the adoption of a
process or product. In medicine or food products, it could be FDA approval, adoption by
physicians, or positive word of mouth. Possible ways of measuring success could be
quantifying media attention in a given period of time. It could be measuring the rate of
adoption over a period of time or looking at the extent of use or the lifetime of a design in
use. Clearly, assessment of demonstration success seems to be measured in some type of
stakeholder response.
In addition to using stakeholders as opinion leaders, stakeholder input can be
utilized in testing by determining what must be validated in a design from a user point of
view. What the designer may consider an indication of successful design may be different
from the views of the relevant stakeholders. One way to do this is to utilize an approach
such as Red Teaming in analyzing the safety of a particular design. This gathers input from
a group of stakeholders who aim to punch holes or determine ways to undermine a design
in an effort to identify weaknesses. This can be considered a method of testing the
concepts and foundations that a design is built on.
It also makes good sense to consider stakeholder needs and interests in designing a
demonstration. Stakeholder input allows for the most appropriate and influential aspect of
a design to be leveraged in demonstration. Demonstrations that effectively engage
stakeholders allow for stakeholders to contribute feedback, whether it be for better designs,
increased testing, or more effective demonstrations, all phases can always benefit from
improvement. This was phrased very well by an article in popular mechanics that was
commenting on the successful implementation of the new I-35W Bridge in Minneapolis,
MN. The author describes "a new kind of infrastructure culture, where new ideas are
folded into the larger work-in-progress, and no one is waiting for one element to be
finished before drawing up plans for the next. And the final product is something that
wasn't agreed to in a backroom, or paid for, sight unseen, by a community already rattled
by recent tragedy. It was an effort that incorporated decisions from the people who will be
driving across it on a daily basis. " [Sofge 2008]
It should be noted that while the value of stakeholders is recognized as especially
important in testing and demonstrating safety, it could also have impacts on the design and
testing process. Petroski advocates the use of external input because he thought it was
useful to reject conventional wisdom and question prior knowledge used to develop
designs. He asserted that "reminders that true causes of failure often take as much of a leap
of the analytical imagination as original design concepts," and that sometimes scientists
were not capable of that leap on their own. [Petroski 1992] Edison recognized the
importance of stakeholders as evidenced by his efforts to create an infrastructure and
market for his incandescent light bulb since "at the time, the new light was not regarded
seriously as a commercial proposition". [K. Long 20061 Companies recognize the
importance of stakeholders in design by tasking marketing departments with finding out
what their customers want. This process has also seeped into the medical device industry.
While a marketing department is used to interact with physicians with regards to
developing new products, they rely on other methods such as continuous monitoring and
after-market surveillance to obtain feedback from physicians with regard to device failures
and needed improvements. In fact, the FDA's Sentinel database can be considered another
method of obtaining information on performance of medical therapies and the need for
improvement. On the surface this may seem outside the context of design, testing and
demonstration, however the nature of continuous monitoring lends itself to being
considered an ongoing field test or a natural experiment (study of actual use without
experimental controls), which can be considered part of the design - testing - redesign
process.
2.5 Organizing Principles
This section reviews and pulls itemized principles from the literature reviewed in
the past two sections. This list came together by searching for widespread agreement across
the existing literature on concepts, principles and practices that would optimize efforts at
safe design, testing and demonstration. Figure 2.5-I shows a diagram that attempts to
organize these principles into four quadrants. Design and demonstration principles are
organized into their distinct halves while testing methods fall somewhere in between.
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This diagram presents the principles, as they were collected across the engineering
and biology-related literature. Since the demonstration principles were discussed primarily
in technology development literature, they were placed in the "Components & Systems
Engineering" column. In practice, demonstrations tend to lend themselves to large physical
exhibitions, something safe design in microscopic organisms may be more difficult to
accomplish. The purpose of this diagram is to show where these practices and principles
seem to have the greatest use and relevance. This thesis will continue to explore these
principles in practice in order to develop a paradigm that can be applied to synthetic
biology. In working towards this goal, it makes sense to consolidate any overlap in
applicable principles. The following tables (Table 2.5-ATable 2.5-B) list engineering
principles that can be considered part of both disciplines. Based on these tables, the
diagram can be readjusted (Figure 2.5-II).
Table 2.5-A
Design Principles ____________
Components & Systems Engineering Engineering Biological Entities
Substitution Substitution Weak choice/ Robust choice
Moderation Limitation of effects Genetic stability
Attenuation Weak choice
Simplification Error tolerance Robust choice
Multiple Mechanisms Layering Layering Strategies
Redundancy in purpose
Redundancy in type
Indicators Simple failures Weak choice
Tagging Engineering Identifiers
Signals
Managing failures Robustness Robust choice
through use
Table 2.5-B
Shared Testing Principles.
Components & Systems Engineering Engineering Biological Entities
Testing reliability of parts Testing in steps
Theoretical testing Theoretical testing
Simulations & Models In vitro
Animal testing
Microcosm testing
Field evaluations Field evaluations
Clinical or Human Subject Testing
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Chapter 3: Historical Antecedents for Synthetic Biology Research
3.1 Retrospective Cases
The previous chapters discuss theory and frameworks of design, testing and
demonstration. They cover traditional engineering design practices in fields such as
structural, electrical or mechanical engineering and biotechnological design practices such
as those used in biological experimentation and bioengineering. Exploring the different
methods used and the types of strategies emphasized, the intention is to consolidate the
best of traditional engineering practices honed over time and the new biotechnological
design practices currently being developed. The following cases, like the literature, are
drawn from both traditional engineering and biotechnology examples. The engineering
examples are retrospective cases, used to provide additional insight into D&T and T&D,
but also to provide external validation for the principles found in the engineering
literature. The biotechnologies, while not quite as old, are meant to serve the same
purpose.
Table 3.1-A
Engineering Pr e-emptive Example Example Example of Example of
Biotechnology or Reactive of Safe of Teting Demonstrating Stakeholder
Design for safety Safety Interaction
Buildings: Engineering Pre-emptive X X X
Crystal
Palace _____ ___
Bridges: Engineering Pre- X X X
Brooklyn emptive/
Bridge _Reactive
Bridges: Engineering Reactive X X X X
New 35W ___________________________________
Devices: Engineering Pre- X X X X
Pacemakers emptive/
Reactive
Vehicles: Engineering Reactive X X
Elevator
Brakes testing as p In n y,
Probiotics Biotechnology Pre-emptive X X
Vaccines Biotechnology Pre- X X X
emptive/
Reactive _____________________________
The following cases were chosen for their intended focus on safety during the
design, testing and demonstration process. In addition to having this type of focus, these
cases are considered successful because they succeeded in maintaining safety over an
extended period of time, and the success of their designs have had undeniable impacts on
the technological advancement of society.
These cases describe the safety challenges faced and the methods used to address
those challenges. They will also discuss why these particular cases are appropriate as
anecdotal evidence feeding principles of design, testing, and demonstration in synthetic
biology. Buildings and bridges were chosen because they are large structures that can be
dangerous to the users if safe design is absent, and they can be subject to external forces
that may not inherently be thought of as hazards. This, specifically, is a similar concern that
the entities engineered in synthetic biology may face, especially since a design in both areas
can be made more dangerous as a result of unanticipated external circumstances. The
specific examples chosen are representative of novel designs to address safety and fairly
comprehensive forethought on the part of designers to anticipate hazards and verify the
safety of their designs.
The literature associated with traditional engineering concepts discussed above held
great emphasis on component and system design. It was pointed out that one of the
weaknesses of this approach is that it may not account for external unanticipated
complexities. The traditional engineering cases may provide some additional guidance in
that area. However, even those approaches do not have to account for uncertainties and
complexities associated with the individual components. The biotechnological cases are
utilized to fill that gap. They have handled safety with these types of biological complexities
in mind.
In considering successful biotechnology cases, both probiotics and vaccines were
chosen because they are current biotechnology products that have been and are being
developed. With some exceptions and precautions, they are two fairly accepted
biotechnologies.
3.1.1 Traditional Engineering Designs
Crystal Palace
The Crystal Palace was a large cast iron and glass hall designed by Joseph Paxton to
house the Great Exhibition of 1851. A building built primarily of glass had the potential to
collapse on its visitors, either due to load or inclement weather. Joseph Paxton's attention
to detail and design using a number of the principles listed above contributed to the
subsequent success of his structure.
First, his specific use of materials included cast and wrought iron as well as glass, all
of which were standardized parts readily available. This facilitated construction, allowing
for immediate replacements when needed, and more importantly providing the ability to
understand and predict the quality and the behavior of the parts. He designed his building
with multiple load pathways giving the beams a dual use, as they were also handy in
funneling water down from the roof. The roof was built to withstand rain, using sloped
glass panels and seamed tarps that moved water quickly away to built in gutters, and the
frame was hung in a way that distributed wind load. He even had young boys crawling
underneath the wooden floors in order remove the bits of paper that fell through the
boards as they posed a fire hazard.
Part of his success was also in the building process. Utilizing principles of design
and testing, he tested samples of the wrought iron and ever beam of the cast iron to
confirm that they would not be weak links in his design. He conducted a preliminary load
and dynamic load tests on his platforms before he continued to build more. These
involved crowding 300 men on a corner of the platform, having them jump in unison, or
running across. He also previewed the exhibition space before Queen Victoria and
conducted some of these tests in front of her and her entourage, gaining her endorsement.
Joseph Paxton's design was a novel approach to architecture and one that has been
imitated many times since. The novelty of the structure, especially with the use of glass,
lent itself to negative responses and expectations from cynics whose intuitive sense told
them that because it has not been done before, it could not or should not be done.
Synthetic biology has had its share of similar responses. It provides a nice example of
significant and thoughtful design and testing that resulted in a stable safe successful
structure.
[Branchflower and Petit 1995; Petroski 1992; Virginia 20011
Brooklyn Bridge
The Brooklyn Bridge was another novel design in suspension bridge building that
at the time would have been the longest suspension bridge in the world connecting New
York City and Brooklyn. It was an ambitious task requiring strong supports and anchors,
and faced with a history of many failed suspension bridges.
John Roebling and his son, Washington Roebling, intended the bridge to be able
to handle six times the expected load. In building for this expectation, they made their own
twisted cables substituting steel instead of iron because the Roeblings believed iron was the
reason many bridges were failing and steel was better at sustaining the elements. They
utilized stone masonry for the middle towers and sunk the caissons at extremely low depths
to ensure better support. In addition to stronger cables for the suspension supports,
Washington Roebling added cable stays, which today is considered possible overkill.
However, given the changes in dynamic loads, from cars to trains, trolleys, walkers and
horse buggies, that extra stability might also be responsible for the survival of the bridge to
this day, and consequently the survival of millions of travelers across it.
While the Roeblings did utilize testing, especially when developing methods to
properly sink and situate the caissons, they serve as an interesting example of testing and
demonstration. When the first cables were strung connecting one bank to the other, one of
the <> crossed the distance in a suspended tub in order to prove the stability of the cables
to the rest of the workers. This type of demonstration established credibility in the actual
possibility of a bridge one day. However, once the bridge was built, soon after it had
opened, a woman let out a random exclamation leading to an exit stampede of people who
were erroneously convinced the bridge was collapsing. [Unknown 18831 Still opening day
had the benefit of a visit from the U.S. President and the then New York governor, who
carried clear endorsements. In addition Washington Roebling's wife Emily Roebling was
the first to cross the bridge. P.T. Barnum wanted to hold a circus parade across the bridge
showing his faith in the structure and was allowed to do so the following year.
The Brooklyn Bridge like the Crystal Palace was structure achieving something
grand, in the face of many doubters especially where safety was concerned. Like the
previous example, it shows a meticulous effort on the part of the designer to ensure the
safety not only of his structure, but of those working on the structure as well. The fact that
working on the structure could have been as much of a hazard as interacting with the final
structure is similar to situation of researchers and students interacting with novel
organisms. In addition, bridges on the whole echo a similar context to synthetic biology in
that the public may have very little choice in the design itself or their exposure to it.
[Birdsall 1983; Burns 1982; NYCRoads.com; Petroski 19921
New 1-35W Bridge
Design and construction of the new 1-35W bridge, also known as the St. Anthony
Falls Bridge, has been an example of extremely successful efforts at safe design, testing and
demonstration. The first 1-35W Bridge, built in 1967, collapsed into the Mississippi river
unexpectedly in 2007 killing 13 people and injuring more than 100. It was the main artery
in and out of the city connecting northern and southern parts of the state. In building a
successful bridge FIGG Engineering, the lead designer on the project, needed to overcome
community skepticism and disappointment, fears and distrust stemming from the
catastrophe. Amongst all the cases presented here, theirs provides the best success stories
for both design and testing, and testing and demonstration.
One of the problems of the original bridge was the lack of redundancies in the
design. The girders and supports had become rusted and cracked leading to the eventual
failure. The new design ensured multiple load pathways none of which were failure critical.
In addition the bridge was designed to take future increases in loads in the eventual case
that an automated public transportation system might be added. It was also equipped
advanced materials and devices such as anti-icing sprayers to manage inclement weather.
Another advanced material used was high-strength concrete, which was less permeable and
hardened faster than traditional types of concrete. Because the concrete was new, they
utilized previous studies conducted by the University of Minnesota, conducted experiments
which allowed them to understand the material and how it would harden, and they
conducted interim tests during implementation to confirm the strength of the material.
They built the bridge in sections, building the sections at a separate sight where they could
better control the conditions and test the piece before installation.
Continually through this process their interactions with the community help build
both support and trust. They held open meetings to gain community input on the
expectations, needs and initial designs. They had a representative available to talk to the
community every weekend, who would provide updates and discuss the progress of the
bridge. Their interactions with the community demonstrated their willingness to hear
stakeholders needs and involve them in the process. They gave the community a sense of
ownership in the bridge.
When the bridge was complete, the final test was conducted. Police cars held up
traffic at the ends of the bridge until it was sufficiently packed and then led the cars across
the bridge demonstrating the ability of the bridge to manage the load. While most would
claim that the initial bridge did not fail for 40 years, they cannot claim such for individual
components of the bridge. Those types of wear and failures collecting over time caused the
overall failure of the bridge. To address these fears, the company installed multiple sensor
systems to monitor the traffic on the bridge, the changes in load, and the strength of the
bridge. There are also sensors to pick up effects of environmental changes on the bridge.
The 1-35W Bridge is a useful example in that it presents a failed design improved
through innovation by an extremely safe design. It also contrasts the damage of fatigue over
time with the benefits of anticipating those failures as well as implementing monitoring as
a form of ongoing field-testing. This bridge provides a successful example of safety in
engineering through the design and testing process as well as the testing and
demonstration process.
[McCarthy 2008; Russel 2008; Sofge 2008; Transportation]
Elevator Brakes
This case was chosen for its clear example of testing and demonstration. Originally,
elevators were typically used for raising and transporting freight, primarily because lack of
dependability on the suspensions posed a huge safety risk for human passengers. While
working on freight elevators, Elisha Otis developed the first elevator brakes designed to
activate when the ropes suspending an elevator failed. He utilized redundancy by creating a
fail-safe. In order to convince people of the safety provided by his innovation, he
demonstrated their function at the New York World's Fair in 1854. The demonstration
involved Otis standing on a raised elevator while someone cut the suspension ropes. As he
intended, his brakes stopped the elevator from falling. This demonstration was successful
in convincing people of the safety provided by his elevators, and enabled the building of
the tall skylines around the world today.
The story of Elisha Otis and the elevator brakes is as effective in exemplifying a
convincing demonstration as the Edison and Bell references in the previous chapter. In
considering demonstrations of safety, this example provides a similar context to synthetic
biology in that both technologies need to convince a cynical and distrustful public of the
safety they are asserting.
[Banuri ; Finder; Infoplease ; Wikipedia]
Pacemakers
The case of pacemakers straddles the line between methods for engineering safety
in devices and methods for managing safety from a biotechnological perspective.
Pacemakers evolved through much iteration by the work of both physicians and engineers.
Initial knowledge of safety concerns was incorporated in the design, but the main purpose
of the device was solely to keep the heart beating. Many advances were incorporated as
greater safety concerns were identified. For example, original pacemakers were external and
utilized plugs for gaining power. When one of the innovators observed that if power were
lost in a hospital, so would the patients be who were dependent on the devices. This lead
to the development of the battery powered pacemakers. The pacemaker case provides
examples of design and testing as well as testing and demonstration.
Current pacemaker innovations manage biostability and biosafety through the
choice of materials for leads and the casings for the device. They are designed to separate
the body completely from the function parts of the device. Some leads have steroid eluding
tips to reduce inflammation and infection that might occur during implantation of leads.
Designing pacemakers involves extensive knowledge of the heart, and programming
pacemakers involves additional understanding. Pacemakers are programmed to manage
various heart problems and the software running the device needs to be just as robust as
the internal workings. Current devices use lithium iodine batteries, which have the benefit
of a slow drop-off in power and can be used to indicate when a battery is failing, an ability
critical for device dependent patients.
Like all clinical drugs, new devices go through similar testing. An electrical device
such as a pacemaker will go through design testing in a laboratory. Animal testing and
other pre-clinical testing will follow this, before moving on to clinical studies with human
subjects. Once a device has been approved and implantation has been adopted, post
market studies have been developing that follow the progress and function of the device.
Companies such as Medtronic make great use of demonstration principles. They
have engineers whose sole purpose is to teach physicians about the devices and perform
demonstrations. They are also involved in instructing the physician on how to use the
device. However, along with this practice is the practice of drawing input from the
physicians they service. In fact, marketing departments in companies such as these work
with physicians to uncover where the next advances are needed. This information makes its
way back to the engineers and scientists designing new and better devices and the cycle
begins again.
Pacemakers were chosen simply because they are smaller devices that have the
added complexity of interacting with biological environments, similar to medical therapy
applications that involve safe chassis design. The uncertainty faced from an external
biological environment can be considered similar. In addition, the process of design and
improvement can be shown most clearly here through a pacemaker history of continual
optimization.
[Jeffrey and Parsonnet 1998; Mallela, Ilankumaran et al. 2004; MOND, SLOMAN et al.
1982]
3.1.2 Current Biotechnologies
Probiotics
Probiotics are "defined as viable microorganisms (bacteria or yeasts) that exhibit a
beneficial effect on the health of the host when they are ingested. They are used in foods,
fermented dairy products, and in pharmaceutical preparations." [Salminen, von Wright et
al. 1998] Due to a history a safe consumption, most commonly in yogurt, many probiotics
have been placed on the GRAS list. Still, many of the bacterial species that constitute
probiotics have actually been isolated from infection sites [Ishibashi and Yamazaki 20011
and might pose a danger to immuno-compromised individuals. Additional concerns have
been raised about possible side effects such as "systemic infections, risk of deleterious
metabolic activities, risk of adjuvant side-effects of immunomodulation, and risk of gene
transfer." [Salminen, von Wright et al. 1998] Recent studies have even shown that a
combination of certain probiotics may increase the chance of an individual dying of
pancreatitis. [Offit 20071 While none of these have been definitive, it does raise the issue
of assuming safety in the case of probiotics especially when new probiotics are being
discovered, created, or modified.
Probably the most useful way of ensuring safety is to work with probiotics whose
behavior is known. Since probiotic effects are strain specific, the choice of a safe probiotics
strain is important. Strain identity helps link strains to a specific health effects and enables
accurate surveillance and epidemiological studies." [Group 2002] Essentially, the use of
prior knowledge is key in developing and incorporating safe probiotics into products. As
for the question of demonstration, companies who use probiotics rely heavily on
associations with healthy food in order to get people to bypass fears that may arise from
realizing that they are consuming bacteria gained from infections.
As an example in this collection of cases, probiotics appears because it involves the
consumption of organisms, perhaps even E. coli. Current trends are slowly moving from
existing microorganisms that are accepted as safe to bioengineered organisms. Like medical
therapies that may arise from synthetic biology, individuals may be working with,
consuming, or internalizing organisms that have the potential to be dangerous. Also similar
to synthetic biology, there have been no overall catastrophes associated with the
consumption of probiotics, although there have been plenty of bacterial infections in the
past, therefore the current pushes for testing is also a pre-emptive stroke at preventing a
health crisis.
Vaccines
"The concept of vaccination is essentially, the introduction of dangerous foreign
material into healthy individuals, for the purpose of developing immunity. [Ellenberg and
Chen 1997] Vaccines utilize viruses or bacteria in a weakened or dead state. Aside from the
potential of organisms to might revert to virulence, [Warren 1986] there are multiple
sources of viral contamination resulting from infected animal tissues as a cell source;
viruses used to establish the cell line; contaminated biological reagents; contamination
during manipulation. [Ellenberg and Chen 1997] Furthermore, vaccines have a shelf life
which means a choice between bacterial contamination (aged vaccine) and exposure to
minimal amounts of mercury (in preservatives). Preservatives such as thimerosal improve
vaccine stability, potency, and safety. However, they may also contain mercury. This has
caused distrust on the part of the public who must trust their children to vaccines. Yet with
all these fears people all over the world are vaccinated.
As mentioned before, one of the ways to create a vaccine is to utilize a virus in its
weakened or dead state and utilize genetic engineering in bacteria, yeast, or mammalian
cells to produce large amounts of antigens/vaccines. [Warren 1986] Another method is to
use a less dangerous relation of the target virus such as using cowpox to vaccinate for
smallpox. Because of the dangerous nature of vaccines, a great deal of testing is involved.
When Jonas Salk first developed the polio vaccine, he tested it on himself and his family
and then went on to run a full trial with child subjects. This not only served as a good test,
it also served as a good demonstration, which encouraged the trust of parents. Today,
vaccines face many of the same clinical trials required for drug testing, and they require
FDA approval. In fact, FDA approval serves as a method of demonstrating safety, however,
other types of demonstrations may be needed in the future as time continues. "Issues
affecting risk perception include the ability to control exposure, whether effects are
immediate or delayed, reversibility of effects, level of trust in responsible institutions and
media attention. The primary sources of public information on vaccine safety are
physicians (especially pediatricians), parenting books and magazines, the Internet, and
friends in health care-related fields." [Ellenberg, Foulkes et al. 20051
Researchers and Physicians overwhelmingly believe that "the risks of vaccine
reactions, both the common mild reactions and the rare, more serious reactions, are very
much outweighed by the public health benefit conferred by current vaccination practices
and policies." One of the most interesting things about vaccines is that despite the possible
health risks, vaccines can be required by a community, school, or by law, which emphasizes
a need for guaranteeing safety.
This second biotechnology case was chosen because it involves working with
pathogens and mimics potential situations that synthetic biologists might eventually take
part in. They are used as medical therapies and therefore must be extremely safe - yet the
possibility and uncertainty of a virus reverting is a fear. In the case of the tumor-killing
bacteria, the fears may be similar; therefore the methods used for design and testing may be
quite informative to synthetic biology. Furthermore, the public health issues associated
with vaccinations highlights the need to assure safety because exposure may not be entirely
voluntary.
3.1.3 Synthetic Biology Projects: Chassis Design
One of the major pushes in safe design for synthetic biology is chassis design. Since
they are the bodies in which programmed pathways shall be implemented, they will
determine the overall survival skills of the organism. Three laboratories were interviewed.
Each of their approaches to chassis design is different as the design is very closely linked to
the intended purposes of the chassis.
Knight Laboratory
Thomas (Tom) Knight's choice of organism for chassis design is a mesoplasma
florum, a weak, non-pathogenic, non-motile bacterium that resides in the gut of insects.
[Knight 2008] They don't have biosynthetic abilities and are extremely dependent on their
host environments for nutrients. In addition, they need a 30 to 32C environment, which
makes warm-blooded animals a poor home, and they lack DNA repair proteins needed to
heal environmental damage. Aside from their low survivability outside the laboratory
environment, they also have low biocompatibility with other organisms, containing genes
that code differently from other organisms. Given the natural survival handicaps that
characterize this organism, its choice inherently employs a number of layered safety
principles such as weak choice, nutrient requirements, and genetic compatibility. As
inherent attributes, low survivability and low threat, allow for early work with this
organism to occur in BSL1 laboratories and reinforces the safety aspects of the chassis.
Mesoplasma florum is a lesser-understood organism, Tom Knight's choice to invest
more time in improving understanding of the bacteria's functions and behavior. His choice
of a weaker organism with inherent safety properties reduces the difficulty in creating an
organism that will not survive or interact with unintended environments. Additionally, the
fact that the safety is naturally inherent might provide for a more stable and reliable safety
system. The choice of mesoplasma florum highlights an intention to stress safety above
functionality. In other words, much of the work Tom will have to engage in will be
converting his safe organisms to safe and functional chassis.
To that end, his work on biological chassis is still in its initial stages. Current work
involves developing tools to alter mesoplasma genetic code and conducting studies to
develop a minimal mesoplasma genome. Developing a minimal genome is an endeavor at
optimizing the organism for it's specific purpose as a chassis. With the removal of
redundant or unnecessary systems, there is less chance that these additional elements will
interfere with mechanisms that are engineered into the organism.
The choice of mesoplasma florum as the "foundation" of a synthetic biological
chassis reduces the risk of escape, survival and genetic interaction with an unintended
environment, while raising the susceptibility of the chassis to lethal culture contamination
within the laboratory. Another challenge posed by mesoplasma florum is its potential high
mutability, which may inactivate existing or added safety mechanisms. Part of the safe
design might involve managing this attribute. Perhaps, in creating a minimal genome,
genetic sequences that promote mutability will be removed. However, this optimization
may create additional challenges if systems that appeared redundant or unnecessary have
remained in the genome because they play a role in unknown and unexpected
circumstances. This possibility will call for testing geared to make sure that the chassis and
the chassis plus additional systems will function as intended and in unexpected conditions.
Church Laboratory
Unlike Tom Knight, George Church's choice for chassis design is Escherichia Coli
(E. coli), a significantly robust organism. [Church 2008] E. coli is a familiar organism with
a long history of research and study behind it. Though motile, it is usually considered
harmless as it resides in the lower intestine of warm-blooded animals. They can survive in
multiple environments that includes outside the body and in laboratory settings. In fact,
they can be grown easily in a variety of mediums and are less vulnerable to contaminants.
While Knight chose mesoplasma florum for its weaknesses, George Church chose
E. coli for its robustness and functionality, considering it the "microbial powerhouse".
[Church 20081 In addition, the ability to work with it is highly enhanced by the body of
research conducted over the years and facilitates a faster realization of the chassis concept.
Since his intended purpose for the chassis include producing biofuels, medical therapy
delivery, and protein generation, it will need to have high survivability in order to support
multiple purposes. The focus on functionality means that much of the engineering must go
towards establishing safety in the design.
At the time of the interview, his laboratory had designed the chassis and was very
close to producing a prototype and entering a testing phase. As common in biological
practices, experimentation has accompanied the process of design realization. The Church
chassis has been designed with specific genetic code and metabolic changes that make them
multi-viral-resistant and unable to survive in the wild.
Since E. coli are robust enough to survive in multiple environments, including the
human body, they pose a serious concern in the case of mutation or acquisition of virulent
DNA, both of which are possibilities given the existence of pathogenic E. coli. In addition
E. coli is capable of transferring its DNA through methods such as conjugation or
transduction. If these escape into an unintended environment, their motility and increased
chance of survival would make them a genuine health or environmental risk. A possible
solution would be to design chassis that are specialized to a very particular environment
and reduce their ability to survive or interact anywhere else. Some of the methods that
could help address these concerns and enable solutions include incorporating specific
nutrient requirements, genetic incompatibility, kill switches or any other safety principles.
Church's design has incorporated nutrient requirements and genetic incompatibility by
adjusting the organism's metabolism and by changing its genetic code. He has also
proposed work on left-handed DNA as a method for incorporating genetic incompatibility.
Given the survivability and possible pathogenicity, the Church laboratory will
definitely have to incorporate studies that report on the organism's ability to escape and
interact with unintended environments. They will also need to show that the organism has
a low chance of becoming a pathogen, especially in the case of medical applications.
Demonstrations of safety will be especially necessary in this case since the intention is to
use the chassis outside the laboratory environment.
Arkin Laboratory
Unlike the previous two laboratories, the research on chassis design conducted at
Adam Arkin's laboratory is geared towards a very specific purpose. They are attempting to
create tumor-seeking bacteria, for the purpose of hunting down tumors within the body
and delivering a therapy that would serve to eliminate it. [Arkin 20091 Like George
Church, the Arkin Laboratory has chosen to utilize E. coli as the foundation for their
chassis design. Since the previous section discusses the general concerns faced when
utilizing E. coli, this section will focus purely on the additional safety concerns elicited by
the intention to use this particular chassis to perform a specific function within the human
body.
In order to explore the safety considerations related to in vivo implementations of
chassis design, it is important to understand how the tumor-seeking mechanism will work.
Bacteria are programmed to express proteins called invasins which allow target tumors and
infiltrate the necrotic region. The organism is encapsulated in a lipid coating that allows it
to evade the immune system. Once at the necrotic site, the bacteria is programmed to
recognize environmental signals and release phages that attack and enter the cancer cells.
These phages express a toxin that kills the cancer cells. The also express a signaling protein
that allows the bacteria to regulate the phage expression. In this way, the bacteria can
deliver just enough therapy as needed.
As of March 2009, the Arkin laboratory had engineered the tumor-seeking bacteria
and was working on the tumor killing part. According to Adam Arkin, they had engineered
the initial virus and coding, conducted initial delivery experiments and were working on
increasing the efficiency of the process and producing the signal that would regulate phase
production in the bacterium.
The most pressing safety concern was the ability to control the bacteria so they
could survive only as long as needed to perform their function. By deleting the gene that
allows it to extract iron, they were able to confine the bacteria to simple survival without
additional growth. Too much bacteria in the blood could be toxic to the patient. Similar to
above, they are working on removing or producing factors that would reduce DNA
exchange, and in addition to reducing the ability to mutate, they are trying to make their
mechanism robust enough that it would take five or more mutations to interfere with the
process.
In addition to the concerns directly associated with E. coli, the Arkin laboratory
will also have to provide additional assurance of the safety of their design because they are
engineering an entity to survive in a human host. In this case FDA clinical requirements
for biologics will guide a share of the testing, addressing questions of bacteria dosage, as
well as predicting how much phage must be produced or carried and what effects the
human biological environment will have.
3.2 Organizing Cases
The following table organizes the various methods utilized in these cases above,
with the addition of the synthetic biology cases. The safe designs listed below (Table 3.2-A)
are not exhaustive, however, they provide evidence of design and testing and testing and
demonstration, and can be labeled with the principles identified in the previous chapter.
Table 3.2-A
Safe D~esign D~esign & Testing &
__________Used Testing Dem~onstration
Crystal Palace Choice of materials Choice of materials
Design for inclement weather Hazard Assessment &
Mitigation
Use standardized parts User-Friendliness
Multiple load paths Redundancies
Testing parts Testing Reliability of
Parts
Testing the platforms Testing Reliability of Testing Reliability of
Parts/ In vitro Parts/ In vitro
experiments experiments
Testing dynamic forces Testing Reliability of Testing Reliability of
Parts/ In vitro Parts/ In vitro
experiments experiments
Demonstrated safety in front of Demonstrating function
the Queen
Utilized Queen's endorsement Choosing an audience
Brooklyn Bridge Used steel in cables instead of Substitution
iron
Reinforced with cable stays Redundancies
Used stone masonry on the tower Choice of materials
Built for future loads and Robustness
advances
Riding suspended across river to Field testing Field testing/
test cable strength Demonstrating
Function/ Choosing a
venue
First crossing by Emily Roebling Demonstrating
Function/ Choosing a
venue/ Demonstrating
designer's faith
The President & Governor Choosing an audience
opened the bridge
New 1-35W High performance concrete Choice of
Bridge Materials/Substitution
Safe Design Design & Testing &
Used Testing Demonstration
Multiple load pathways Redundancies
No failure critical pathways Redundancies
Designed for future loads Robustness
Anti-icing sprayers Hazard Assessment/
Mitigation
Used prior studies to assess In vitro experiments/
Concrete Testing reliability of
parts
Conducted interim tests of Testing reliability of
materials during implementation parts
Tested sections before adding to Testing reliability of
bridge parts/ In vitro tests
Installed sensors for continuous Natural experiments
monitoring
Held community meetings and Choosing audience/
incorporated input Choosing venue
Representative held weekly talks Choosing audience/
with community Choosing venue
Packed the bridge with traffic on Controlled Field Test
the first open crossing
Elevator Brakes Utilized brakes on freight Tested before
demonstrated
Utilized World's Fair as a venue Choosing venue
World's Fair visitors as audience Choosing audience
Dramatic risk to own life Demonstrating the
designers faith
Pacemakers Requires biosafety and biostability Choice of Materials/
in materials Substitution
Years of safety adjustments and Iteration
advancements
Use steroid eluting tips to prevent Hazard Assessment/
infection Mitigation
Designed to adapt to multiple Hazard Assessment/
heart problems Mitigation
Electronics completely encased Shielding?
Lithium iodine battery Simple failures
Pre-clinical testing In vitro/ Animal
models
Clinical testing In vivo
Experience used as demonstration Natural experiments/
Demonstrating function
Marketing & teaching physicians Choosing venue/
Choosing audience
Gaining physician input Choosing audience
Probiotics Choice of probiotics strain Substitution/ Choice
of material
Eliminating antibiotic resistance Limitation of effects
genes
Safe Design Design & Testing &
U~sedl Testing Demonstration
Studies on probiotics properties In vitro testing
Pre-clinical studies In vitro testing/
animal models
Observance of behavior in the In vivo testing
body
Clinical studies In Vivo testing/
Randomization &
Matched controls
Surveillance studies Natural Experiments
History of use Natural Experiments/
Demonstration of
function
Beneficial presence in intestines Creating associations
Vaccines Use weakened or killed strain Limitation of Effects
Use weaker relation of disease Substitution/ Choice
of material
Pre-clinical studies In vitro testing/
Animal models
Clinical testing In vivo testing/
Randomization &
Matched Controls
Testing batches of the vaccine In vitro test
Testing the growth substance for Testing reliability of
contaminants parts
Administered to own family and Demonstrating
self function/
demonstrating
designer's faith
Knight Chassis Choice of mesoplasma florum Weak choice
Nutrient specificity Nutrient requirements
Genetic incompatibility Biological isolation
Church Chassis Choice of E. coli Robust choice
Metabolic dependencies Nutrient requirements
Multi-virus resistance Biological isolation
Genetic incompatibility Biological isolation
Arkin Chassis Choice of E. coli Robust choice
Regulating phage production Limitation of effects
Deleting ability to acquire iron Nutrient requirements
Reducing DNA exchange Biological isolation
Reducing susceptibility to Redundancy - no-
mutation failure critical
pathways
Reducing the ability to mutate Genetic stability
The various principles identified are representative of only a sampling of the many
design specifications made for safety as well as the testing and demonstrating practices to
ensure and assure of that safety. Given these identified principles, the cases can also be
categorized in a style similar to the principles (Figure 3.2-1). The Crystal Palace and
Brooklyn Bridge provide clearer examples for design and testing. The elevator brake story
on the other hand is a short but effective example of testing and demonstration. The New
1-35W Bridge, as well as the pacemaker and vaccine examples all seem to balance the
necessity of both design and testing and testing and demonstration. Probiotics, as they are
developed currently tend to be existing bacteria, though newer efforts have been directed
towards genetically modified probiotics. Still, this fact pushes it into the testing and
demonstration domain. The pacemakers, vaccines and probiotics all have a certain amount
of standard they need to meet in order to be acceptable, courtesy of the FDA. Though
many probiotics are on the GRAS list, some do require a small bit of clinical study. As for
the synthetic biology cases, all three designs fall within the realm of design and testing
however the Arkin design and the Church design are moving very quickly towards a phase
of testing to validate. All three are placed near the vertical center since the methods of safe
design do involve layering and limitation of effects.
Components & Biotechnological
Systems Engineering Entities
Knight
Design
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Figure 3.2-1
3.3 Implications for Synthetic Biology
The retrospective cases such as the Crystal Palace, the Brooklyn Bridge, and the
New 1-35W Bridge, as well as the pacemakers, verify that where design and testing are of
high priority, successful safety is possible. This endorses the approach of the three
laboratories in engineering safe design, especially the Knight laboratory, where safety is
prioritized above functionality and speed. Furthermore, where testing and demonstration
have been effective, the progress of the technology has been supported. The elevator brakes
is the best example of this, however, the fact that the Crystal Palace and Brooklyn Bridge
succeeded in standing despite cynical assertions to the contrary also acted as a
demonstration of safety. The novelty of the 1-35W Bridge's success in standing may need a
little more time before that aspect gives it credibility, however, the interaction with
stakeholders provided a different method of gaining the public trust. All of these can
provide examples of demonstration methods that can assure successful progress.
While design and testing is the current phase occupied by the Knight, Church and
Arkin designs, all three will eventually enter the testing and demonstration phase. The
individual projects of each of these laboratories will determine the extent to which they will
need to provide safety validation for their designs. The Knight design has been shown not
to survive outside the laboratory through natural design, therefore it may be easier to
establish the safety of the design. Though minimal, the Knight lab has the benefit of
established research to back claims that the organism is safe, however it will need to
demonstrate that changes to incorporate chassis functionality will not have changed the
inherent safety of the organism.
The Church design will have a greater challenge validating the safety of the
organism because that safety has been added by genetic adjustments. In order to convince
stakeholders that it can be used safely as an all-purpose chassis, the Church lab will need to
show reliable control over the behavior of the organism in addition to assurances that
future added pathways will not alter that safety.
Finally, the Arkin design, might have the greatest challenge in that this design is
deliberately placed in contact with human tissue for the purpose of delivering a medical
therapy. Out of the three, this design will definitely have to undergo some type of clinical
testing before it can be used and adopted. In addition, it must not only prove itself safe,
but there must be proof of effectiveness. It was mentioned above that pacemakers, vaccines
and probiotics are subject to FDA approval, therefore, they have established methods of
testing and demonstration since gaining approval requires substantial validation of safety.
It may be that the fact that the Arkin design already has a set of regulated standards it must
meet, might mean that it gains overall approval, acceptance and adoption earlier than the
other two designs.
Chapter 4: Conclusion
4.1 Revisiting Research Questions
In Chapter 1, it was asked: what methods are used to implement safety and increase
public confidence, both currently and in the past, and how can those methods be applied
in synthetic biology to help advance the field safely. This study took a look at past cases and
at synthetic biology cases and explored the types of safe design, testing, and demonstration
being used.
4.2 Thoughts on Current Synthetic Biology Research
The three laboratories investigated have different approaches to chassis design and
therefore different safety challenges to manage. Tom Knight's safety challenges will most
probably focus on preventing functional design to interfere with the natural safety of the
organism. While he has traded immediate functionality for immediate safety in his design,
the time he invests in developing tools and learning about the organism serve to his benefit
in proving his organism is safe. George Church has taken the less obscure route with E.
coli that promises more immediate advances and results, however he has a tougher safety
challenge in that his organism is robust and will need to be endowed with a number of
safety mechanisms. Furthermore, since these mechanisms are not natural to the organism,
he will need to assure the stability of his altered organism. Adam Arkin has the greatest
challenge. In addition to the ones that Church faces with E. coli, he has to ensure safety
within a human host because he intends his chassis to be injected into the human
bloodstream.
In all three cases testing will need to show that these designs can participate reliably
in a system that considers external forces as functional components. When changes in the
environment occur, these designs must show that they will not be changed nor will they
affect the environment. In looking at these three cases, it is clear that they share
methodologies similar to both traditional engineering and biotechnologies. It is unclear yet
whether the testing and demonstration methodologies will fall follow the same pattern.
Testing and demonstration as yet seems to be a less emphasized area in the safe design
process, however, in all cases, when there was a necessity to prove to the public or other
stakeholders that the design was safe, there was specific effort expended. With the amount
of cynicism and perceived uncertainty associated with biotechnologies, it seems that greater
attention testing and demonstrating safety will have to be paid.
4.3 Concluding Observations and Further Research
The following are additional conclusions or observations arrived at through this
research. They are essentially thoughts proposed with ideas for future investigations that
may further explore their validity.
It has been said from the outset that one of the main reasons for this research has
been the interest in the synthetic biology community to not only design safety, but also to
establish that safety in a credible way that avoids the complications that GMOs created,
especially in the European reaction. To that end, it is worth separating the above cases
along the lines of reactive and pre-emptive. In attempting to do that, the only case that
clearly stands out as pre-emptive is probiotics. In this case, safety has already been
established, whether reliable or not, by a history of natural consumption. Yet there are
scientists questioning the wisdom of the GRAS list and calling for increased testing and
demonstration given the advent of newer or genetically engineered probiotics microbes. It
is also interesting in that the probiotics have already gained public approval and it is the
scientific approval that needs attention. While it is a similar case of pre-emptivly
highlighting and establishing safety, the fact that they have already gained acceptance may
provide the luxury of being able to call attention to safety issues. The other cases have some
measure of reactive motivation. In exploring the cases, it seems that there is a fine line
between reactive and pre-emptive motivation. In reactive cases, things have gone wrong
that have prompted a safer design. In pre-emptive cases, one would assume that the
concern has not happened before. However in the cases, there seems to be a mix, because
each engineered design incorporates novel methods of handling possible failures where the
concern for possible failures is motivated by some past occurrence. In this way,
technologies tend to take on an interactive process of safe design where past failures may
prompt thoughtful recognition for other failures that have not occurred. However, in the
case of synthetic biology the failure of safe design is not an option. The apparent thin line
between reactive and preemptive safe design, might ultimately support the claim that
nothing can be 100% safe nor is it possible to be preemptive in all cases. It is yet early and
time may show some other challenges faced by synthetic biologists where future endeavors
to design safety might become a reactive response.
The cases presented above reveal stories of safe design, testing and demonstration.
In exploring these cases, details were presented discussing the efforts on the part of the
designers to ensure the safety of their designs. In reviewing the research currently being
conducted on chassis development in synthetic biology, it is worth exploring what synthetic
biologists are doing that is similar and what they are doing that is different. Synthetic
biologists are clearly looking for ways to engineer safety into their designs. This matches the
actions of Joseph Paxton and John Roebling. However these designers did not need to
consider public fears in the same way as Synthetic Biologists. In that way, proactive efforts
to discuss safety and determine expectations may single synthetic biology out from previous
genetic engineering fields. Further research might return to the cases, adding parallel
failures for comparison and exploring the main principles of failures in those cases. Then
follow-up on the chassis cases would provide more evidence from the additional progress,
allow for a more rigorous comparison and discussion either confirming or denying the
whether current chassis design seems to be following practices common to past success or
past failures.
Given the categories of design and testing and testing and demonstration, mapping
the principles according the four quadrants allowed a better understanding of where the
subsequent cases fell. It seems that the Crystal Palace and the Brooklyn Bridge had
immense focus on design and testing while the elevator and the new 135W had significant
focus on testing and demonstrating. When exploring what practices go into design and
testing, and testing and demonstration, it could be that design and testing may have greater
influence over establishing safety, while testing and demonstration may have greater
influence over progress in the field. If these associations are correct, it could be inferred
that the Crystal Palace and Brooklyn Bridge cases might have had more focus on
establishing safety, while the Elevator case may have had more focus on promoting progress
associated with their technology. This draws interesting attention to the cases in the middle
that manage a balance. Further research would also recommend a broadening of the cases
to include failures and more detailed study in all of them. A categorizing of these cases
would hold more rigor if empirical measures of success were determined and applied.
Perhaps a systems dynamics approach modeling the retrospective cases might provide a tool
for empirically assessing the relationship between principles in those categories and success.
Looking at which quadrants the cases occupy, it seems interesting that with the
exception of the Elevator Brakes, the New 1-35W bridge, pacemakers, vaccines, and even
probiotics are all areas where the final product must meet a type of standard set by the
government. State governments typically set building codes, but the builders of that bridge
had the additional pressure of answering the public's expectations, especially because they
chose to interact with the public on a regular basis. They implemented an extensive
outreach campaign in order to show the public that they were truly building a better, safer
bridge. Designs that tend to have medical applications seem to gain credibility through
practice and clinical trials, however it isn't the clinical trials that convince patients, it's
their doctors who may have greater trust in medications or devices that have been FDA
approved. Which leads to an interesting question for synthetic biology. They are currently
working on safe designs, yet no matter how safe an organism might be, prior knowledge on
the part of the public or legislators may diminish hopes of being accepted or adopted. In
the discussion of self-regulation and government involvement, this observation seems to
support government involvement and the setting of safety standards. This is a question that
would need further follow-up and analysis, perhaps exploring the influence of government
standards on the safety of designs. This might involve exploring the regulatory structures
that may have been present or may have imposed requirements on both the success and
failed cases and truly analyze whether that involvement increased safety, or non-
involvement decreased it. Cases would have to extend to those with no government
involvement.
4.4 Advice For...
4.4.1 Synthetic Biologists
While attention to safe design and testing is critical, there is a need for appropriate
validation that credibly demonstrates that safety. Given the physical nature of synthetic
biology, short of licking the petri dish, it may be difficult to present something as dramatic
as the elevator brake demonstration. Taking cues from the new 1-35W Bridge where true
demonstration of successful safety may need time, interacting with stakeholders has seemed
to create exceptional community support and faith for the project. Exercises such as red
teaming designs may be a similar step that brings the same type of rewards.
Given the ongoing debate between self-regulation and government involvement, it
seems useful to suggest that government involvement may eliminate arbitrary
establishments of safe design. Standardized practices for design, testing and demonstration
that are regulated may provide the best method for ensuring safe design across the board as
well as gaining safe acceptance and adoption in the field. However the challenge then lies
in who will determine those standards for safety and what type of evidence would be
considered convincing and substantial?
4.4.2 Regulators
Synthetic biology is not a field relegated to the elite, university scientist crowd.
With the adoption of standardized parts and protocols, the ability to tinker with genetic
elements will become extremely accessible. Recognizing that scientists are looking for a way
to manage safety before something goes wrong, the goal should not be to regulate what
synthetic biology is creating, but what types of safety standards the creations should meet.
This could involve interacting with experts in the field to establish measures and
expectations of safety as a result of safe design.
Once the chassis become functional, the open-source nature of synthetic biology
may make it difficult to ensure the safety of the chassis, as they will enter the hands of
other scientists or tinkerers. Perhaps a good way of managing this might be establishing
rating systems for the these designs, where certain designs may not be able to survive
anywhere but a BSL1 laboratory and therefore access to these is easier, while designs that
allow for more complicated engineering might have higher safety requirements, requiring
the individual to satisfy those. This may allow for regulating safe design without interfering
with scientific progress.
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